14 Charles Lane New York, N.Y. 10014

May 3, 1977

No. 7

To the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed are the following items:

- 1) The March 22-24, 1977, United Secretariat minutes and attachments prepared by the Bureau.
- 2) Report on the Central American Trotskyist Conference, by Roberto Torres.
- 3) Report on the Congress of the Costa Rican PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores), by Roberto and Rodrigo.
- 4) Letter from the Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire (GMR) of Quebec to the Groupe Socialiste des Travailleurs du Québec (GSTQ), the organization in Canada that is affiliated to the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International.

Comradely,

Caroline Lund

Carolia La

MINUTES OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT MEETING March 22, 23, 24, 1977

PRESENT: Adair, Aubin, Claudio, Duret, Fourier, Frej, Galois, Georges, Johnson, Jones, Marline, Otto, Walter.

IEC PRESENT: Marcela, Pedro, Petersen, Segur, Stateman, Susan.

GUESTS: Allio, Roberto, Roland.

AGENDA:

- 1. Southern Africa Solidarity
- 2. French Elections
- 3. Lutte Ouvrière
- 4. OCRFI
- 5. Eurocommunism and the Development of Opposition in Eastern Europe
- 6. Moreno Letter
- 7. Spain
- 8. Developments in the Steelworkers in the United States
- 9. East Europe
- 10. World Congress Preparations
- 11. Bureau Report 12. Miscellaneous
- 13. Special Commission
- 14. Slaughter Letter

Chair: Johnson

1. Southern Africa Solidarity

Petersen reported on initial appeals for solidarity demonstrations with South Africa for June 16, the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto upsurge.

Discussion.

MOTION: June 16, 1977, will mark the first anniversary of the Soweto rebellion which sparked off a huge mass upsurge of the oppressed black masses of South Africa against the apartheid Vorster regime. Already there are moves to commemorate this anniversary by solidarity actions: the British National Union of Students has called a demonstration for this purpose on June 19 and other activities are planned. In addition, several Soweto student leaders have appealed for international activity at that time. This appeal has already been backed by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and leading figures from the British labor movement. The Fourth International calls upon its sections and sympathizing organizations to campaign, together with all other forces possible, to gain wide support for these proposals for action from the workers movement, anti-apartheid movement, liberation movements, solidarity committees, immigrant and minority organizations, other organizations of the oppressed, from the student, academic and artistic milieu, and from other prominent individuals.

CARRIED

2. French Elections

Segur reported on the results of the French elections and the results of the electoral slate of the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, Lutte Ouvrière, and the Organisation Communiste des Travailleurs.

Discussion.

3. Lutte Ouvrière

Aubin reported on relations with Lutte Ouvrière.

Discussion.

MOTION: That the Bureau organize a meeting with a delegation of Lutte Ouvrière as soon as possible to discuss the implementation of the proposals contained in the earlier correspondence and that the United Secretariat delegation include representatives of the Political Bureau of the LCR. (See United Secretariat minutes of February 1977.)

CARRIED

4. OCRFI

Aubin reported on proposals for the organization of the public discussion with the OCRFI.

Discussion.

MOTION: (See Attachment F.) CARRIED

Statement by Galois and Johnson: (See Attachment F.)

5. Eurocommunism and the Development of Opposition in Eastern Europe.

Walter initiated a discussion of the evolution of the Communist parties in Western Europe, the limitations on their differentiations from Moscow and their relation to the developing opposition in Eastern Europe.

Discussion.

6. Moreno Letter.

Marcela reported on a letter from Moreno to the United Secretariat concerning an interview with Ernest Mandel that appeared in a Spanish magazine, Viejo Topo. (See Attachment A.)

Discussion.

MOTION by Marcela: That the United Secretariat make a public declaration clarifying the Viejo Topo interview falsified positions of Comrade Mandel and that an article be prepared which restates our positions on Stalinism for publication in INPRECOR and the Spanish journals.

Motion by Galois: It has been reported to the United Secretariat that Comrade Mandel intends to write an article for submission to Viejo Topo correcting the errors in interpretation of his opinion in the interview. It has also been reported to the United Secretariat that the Spanish LCR intends to run the correction in its publication if Viejo Topo refuses. The United Secretariat considers this a satisfactory solution to the problem.

For Marcela motion: O

For Galois motion: 13

MOTION: To refer to the Bureau the preparation of a reply to the letter from Comrade Moreno.

CARRIED

7. Spain

Pedro reported on the coming elections and the perspectives

of the LCR toward achieving legality. He reported that recently there have been several leadership discussions between the LCR and the LC.

Discussion.

8. Developments in the Steelworkers in the United States

Stateman reported on the recent election for president of the United Steelworkers of America and the significance of the Sadlowski campaign and Steelworkers Fight Back.

Discussion.

9. Eastern Europe

Georges initiated a discussion on possible activities during the time of the Belgrade conference.

Discussion.

AGREED to continue the discussion in the Bureau.

10. World Congress Preparations

Johnson reported on initial discussions in the Bureau concerning the size and location of the congress, on the preparations of a budget for the congress and he progress of the poll of IEC members on the date of the congress. Neither the proposal for December 1977 nor May 1978 has received a majority yet with about one-third of the IEC members not yet responding.

AGREED to send a letter to all those who have not yet responded informing them that we will decide the results on the basis of votes received by the time of the next meeting of the United Secretariat.

AGREED to begin consulting with the sections and sympathizing organizations on the projected budget.

MOTION: to accept the following contributions for the IIDB.

- 1. Declaration of the International Majority Tendency plus a statement by Jones.
- 2. March 7. 1977, letter from the OCRFI to the United Secre-
- 3. A response to this letter by the Political Bureau of the French LCR.

CARRIED

11. Bureau Report

A. MOTION: that comrades Claudio and Johnson be the United Secretariat representatives to the congress of the Greek OCIG.

CARRIED

B. Claudio reported on a meeting with a group of dissidents in the Chilean MIR who have requested relations with the Fourth International.

Discussion.

AGREED to give them the political discussion documents for the coming World Congress.

- C. Correspondence with Australia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, and Venezuela was reported.
- D. MOTION on recording of votes in the minutes: The United Secretariat decides to record in the minutes of meetings of the United Secretariat the votes of all members of the United Secretariat, including full, fraternal, and consultative members. This reverses a decision of the May 1975 meeting of the United Secretariat and of the January 1975 meeting of the International Executive Committee.

CARRIED

E. Letter from French LCR concerning IEC membership.

Discussion.

AGREED to invite Comrade Allio to all meetings of the United Secretariat, and to mandate the Bureau to send a reply to the LCR letter. (See Attachment B.)

12. Miscellaneous

A. Letter from three International Belshevik Tendency members in the French LCR. (See Attachment C.)

MOTION: to accept the proposed reply. (See Attachment C.)

CARRIED

B. Revolutionary Marxist Organizing Committee.

Jones reported on documents received from RMOC and a letter
from Hedda Garza. (See Attachment D.)

Discussion.

MOTION by Jones: The United Secretariat has received a bulletin of the Socialist Union (of the USA) which contains a resolution of that organization declaring the SWP (of the USA) to be "a formidable obstacle to the building of a genuine Trotskyist movement," and drawing the logical conclusion from this that our movement will have to be built in a struggle against it."

These positions are in contradiction with the resolution of the February 1976 IEC condemning the expulsion of the IT and calling for the reintegration of all supporters of the Fourth International in the United States into the SWP -- a position only possible on the principled basis that supporters of the Fourth International recognize the SWP as a revolutionary and Trotskyist organization and as the only organization in political solidarity with the Fourth International in the United States. The position of the Socialist Union is in clear contradiction with the resolution of the Fourth International and clearly establishes membership in that or in any organization holding this position as incompatible with a position of fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International in the United States.

The Socialist Union was in the past a component part of the RMOC. Whether this latter organization still exists is not clear. The United Secretariat, in order to resolve this situation, calls on all those loyal to the Fourth International within the Socialist Union or RMOC to resign from that organization, to reject the characterization of the SWP in the resolution of the Socialist Union, and to apply for membership in the SWP, as in the February 1976 IEC resolution, and to build the SWP as the organization in the

United States in political solidarity with the Fourth International. Those not following this course will automatically place themselves outside the framework of sympathizing supporters of the Fourth Inpernational. Those carrying this out will have the same status in relation to the Fourth International as specified in the February 1976 IEC resolution.

The United Secretariat calls on the SWP to reintegrate such omrades rapidly into the SWP, as they demonstrate in practice heir commitment to loyally build the SWP.

CARRIED

Statement by Galois and Johnson: We voted for the motion on the RMOC because we agree with the decision it makes concerning the RMOC. Our vote in no way implies agreement with the February 1976 IEC motion on the IT. We voted against that motion at the time, and we have not changed our view.

MOTION by Jones; The United Secretariat has received a letter from Hedda Garza and nine other comrades stating that they have broken relations with the RMOC, hold the SWP to be a revolutionary organization, and have applied for membership in the SWP.

The United Secretariat urges the SWP to rapidly reintegrate these comrades into the SWP, as they demonstrate in practice their commitment to loyally build the SWP.

CARRIED

C. Adair reported on the convention of the Movement for a Socialist Republic.

Discussion.

13. Special Commission.

Discussion on the commission report continued.

MOTION: (See letter to United Secretariat members only of March 30, 1977.)

CARKLLL

14. Slaughter Letter

MOTION: that the Bureau edit the reply to Slaughter. (See Attachment E.) [Note: This attachment is not included since it was subsequently printed in IP.] CARRIED [See IP, Vol. 15, #15, April 25, 1977.]

Meeting adjourned.

Bogotá, febrero 1/77

A los compañeros del Secretariado Unificado de la IV Internacional

Estimados camaradas:

En mí carácter de miembro del SU, de dirigente trotskysta durante 35 años y militante durante 37, de dirigente de la Tendencia Bolchevique y del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores de la Argentina, he resuelto asumir la responsabilidad de dirigirme personalmente al SU, a las tres tendencias existentes en la Internacional, a todos los dirigentes y militantes responsables para solicitarles que hagamos una urgente delimitación pública de las declaraciones - a mí entender revisionistas - del compañero Mandel a la revista "Topo Viejo" de Barcelona, publicadas en los números 2 y 3 de esa revista, de fechas noviembre y diciembre de 1976, respectavamente.

I. - LAS DECLARACIONES DEL COMPANERO MANDEL:

l. - En las declaraciones que comentamos, el compañero Mandel sostiene que los partidos comunistas europeos han dejado de ser contrarevolucionarios, traidores, que están en una etapa de transición "el aurocomunismo", que no se sabe cómo terminará. Unas pocas citas son suficientemente ilustrativas:

"También será difícil - no digo imposible pero sí difícil - que el PCE adopta una actitud claramente rompehuelga, como lo han hecho el PCI y el pripio PCE en algunas épocas de su actuación. Y ello porque las relaciones de fuerza en el movimiento obrero español son muy distintas".

"La extrema izquierda francesa - a pesar de sus limitaciones, su debilidad, su división organizativa - tiene hoy un peso político real y posee la capacidad potencial de imponer un giro revolucionario a la dirección reformista del PC".

"Los compañeros dirigentes del Partido Comunista (español), especialmente sus cuadros obreros, deberán asumirla y resolverla, y espero y confio que sean capaces de resolverla positivamente, en el sentido de que vuelvan a la senda del marxismo revolucionario".

- "El eurocomunismo es una política de transición, aunque nadie sabe hacia donde o hacia que. Quizá represente una transición hacia la absorción de los partidos comunistas por parte de la socialdemocracia, cosa en mi opinión poco probable, pero no totalmente excluible. Quizá sea una transición hacia un nuevo stalinismo. Y también, por qué no? puede ser una transición, por parte de los cuadros obreros del partido, hacia un reencuentro con el marxismo revolucionario, con el leninismo. La lucha política y la experiencia práctica nos dirán que es lo que va a ocurrir".
- 2. El futuro de los PC europeos, para el c. Mandel, es incierto y no descarta que se vuelvan marxistas revolucionarios. Es así que nos dice "el eurocomunismo es una política de transición, aunque nadie sabe hacia donde o hacia qué . . . puede ser una transición hacia un reencuentro con el marxismo revolucionario, con el leninismo", los compañeros dirigentes del Partido Comunista (español) espero y confío de que sean capaces de resolverla positivamente, en el sentido que vuelvan a la senda del marxismo revolucionario", a "la dirección reformista del PC (francés)" se le

puede "imponer" "un giro revolucionario". Para esconder su revisionismo, su capitulación, el compañero Mandel combina esos vaticionios con expresiones tales como "por parte de los cuadros obreros del partido", "especialmente los cuadros obreros", "dirigentes del PC" (español) y "la extrema izquierda francesa" en cada una de esas citas respectivamente. En la misma linea de razonamiento asegura "que las relaciones de fuerza en el movimiento obrero español" son la causa de que el PC español no puede ser claramente rompehuelgas.

Pero esa clase de circunstancias agravan el revisionismo y no lo disimulan como creer el c. Mandel, ya que eso significa que los partidos comunistas pueden volverse revolucionarios por la presión de sus cuadros obreros en España, de "la extrema izquierda" en Francia. Dicho de otra forma, la creación de la IV Internacional ha sido un trágico error histórico ya que los partidos comunistas son recuperables para la revolución si loscuadros obreros, la extrema izquierda o la relación de fuerzas actúan con fuerte presion sobre ellos.

- 3. El c. Mandel comete un error muy grave: confundir el rol de rompehuelgas en las luchas económicas con el rol contrarevolucionario político. Son mucho más graves las traiciones políticas que el rol que juegue en las luchas sindicales del movimiento obrero. El c. Pierre Frank hace ya muchos años que explicó como el PC francés combina cierta defensa diaria, cotidiana de los trabajadores en las fábrica, cierto rol de dirección y de vanguardia en las luchas económicas para poder de esa manera mentener el prestigio que le permita cometer horrendas traiciones políticas. El c. Mandel no ha comprendido esta dialectica de los PC. De lo que se trata es del rol de rompehuelgas políticas, del rol de traidores y contra-revolucionarios políticos de los PC, dejando de lado las pequeñas o grandes concesiones que hagan por la base en las luchas económicas del movimiento obrero. Y el PCE se ha cansado durante el año 1976 detraicionar políticamente al proletariado y a las nacionalidades oprimidas españolas, de jugar a favor del régimen, sin que el c. Mandel se de por notificado y se vea en la obligación de denunciarlo. Los c. vascos tienen que decirle a toda la Internacional si el c. Mandel ha acertado o no, si el PC cada vez es mejor o peor en las luchas políticas contra el régimen.
- 4. Tan grave como lo que dice, es lo que el compañero Mandel no dice en su entrevista. En ningún momento manífiesta quelos Partidos Comunistas europeos, especialmente el español, están traicionando y seguirán traicionando cada vez más a medida que siga el ascenso revolucionario, porque esa es la función a la que historicamente están condicionados los partidos comunistas desde el año 1935, desde que adoptaron la estrategia de la colaboración de clases y del frente popular con la burguesía.

En ningún lugar Mandel habla de la crisis irreversible de los partidos comunistas, provocada por la contradicción insoluble entre su política y dirección contrarevolucionaria y el ascenso del movimiento de masas. Por el contrario, sistemáticamente insiste en que no está descartado para nada el que los partidos comunistas, con sus direcciones incluidas, cambien en un santido revolucionario.

Tampoco denuncia el frente único contrarevolucionario existente entre el Kremlin y los PC, el imperialismo y los partidos socialistas y dentro de ese frente único contrarevolucionario que les cabe a los PC europeos.

- 3 - (PG. 8)

II. - EL CARACTER CONTRAREVOLUCIONARIO . PRAIDOR DEL EUROCOMUNISMO

l. - Solo un impresionista puede hablar de que el eurocomunismo admite tres variantes: socialdemocracia, stalinismo y marxismo revolucionario. El eurocomunismo es una doble adaptación de los partidos comunistas: al ascenso de masas europeo y al propio imperialismo. La adaptación al ascenso de masas tiene un solo objectivo: servir major a la contrarevolución imperialista. Para un trotskysta la discusión sobre el eurocomunismo tiene un límite: la imposibilidad de que los partidos comunistas con sus direcciones se vuelvan revolucionarios. Dicho de otra forma la discusión solo puede girar alrededor de los cambios formales que los partidos comunistas europeos están efectuando para mejor servir a la contrarevolución imperialista-stalinista durante el ascenso de la revolución europea.

Planteado así el problema hay una sola cuestión a responder: son ya los partidos comunistas europeos neosocialidemócratas o siguen siendo stalinistas? Según nuestra opinión son stalinistas porque continua su estrecha relación con la URSS. Si hubiera una guerra de su imperialismo con aquella crremos que defenderían al estado obrero y no al imperialismo. Pero como la contradicción no es hoy entre la URSS y el imperialismo sino entre el ascenso revolucionario y la contrarevolución europea (imperialista-burocrática), los PC al igual que los partidos socialistas, forman parte de ese frente contrarevolucionario. Por lo tanto los PC frente al movimiento obrero y de masas adoptan posiciones socialdemócratas para mejor jugar su rol contrarevolucionario: están cada vez más cerca de su propio imperialismo sin haber llegado al punto de ser sus agentes directos lo que los transformaría en partidos socialdemócratas. Pero esta diferencia es hoy dia secundaria ya que ante el ascenso revolucionario, socialdemocratas y partidos comunistas europeos juegan un rol semejante. Ese rol la socialdemocracia lo cumple estrecha y diractamente ligada a su imperialismo y los PC a través del Kremlin, pero la función es la misma: servir a la contrarevolución por medio de la colaboración de clases.

2. - El trotskysmo tiene como una de sus razones de ser la lucha implacable contra los partidos socialistas y comunistas, pasados al campo de la contrarevolución imperialista y cada vez más traidores de la clase obrera. Para el trotskysmo este paso de los partidos reformistas al campo de la contrarevolución imperialista es un hecho contundente e irreversible que llevó a la fundación de la IV Internacional. Si los partidos socialistas y comuninstas pudieran ser cambiados y transformados en revolucionarios, no se hubiera fundado la III Internacional, primero, y la IV Internacional, después. Para los trotskystas los partidos comunistas del mundo enter, especialmente los europeos, tienen una clara política traidora, de frente popular, de colaboración con la burguesía. ?El eurocomunismo puede significar que los PC abandonen su política frente populista como sugiere el c. Mandel? Categóricamente negamos esa posibilidad.

Es que la degeneración de ambas internacionales obedeció a profundas causas sociales: la burocratización de estos partidos lo que daba una sólida base económica y social a su reformismo y los ataba de por vida, por razones económicas y socialies, al campo de la contrarevolución imperialista. Aunque el proceso de degeneración de la III Internacional fue diferente al de la II Internacional, al ir del centro a la periferia, de la burocratización del PC de la URSS a los partidos nacionales, no dejópor eso de ser un proceso de burocratización y de degeneración que marcó a todos los

4 - (PG. 9,

partidos comunistas. Todos están asentados en una burocracia política y sindical. En donde estos partidos logran un gran apoyo de masas esta burocratización se acentúa, pero con rasgos "nacionales" ya que esta burocracia privilegiada comenza a tener como principal fuente de sus ingresos al propio "mercado nacional" con sus sindicatos, puestos parlamentarios y aparato partidario. Esa es la situación de los PC italiano, francés, español y portugués.

Esta burocratización, esta capa privilegiada es la que hace que sea imposible por razones sociales la regeneración revolucionaria de los partidos comunistas nacionales.

3. - El que algunos partidos comunistas hayan tomado poder o hayen dirigido unarevolución no quiere decir que hayan cambiado histórica y estructuralmente, que hayandejado de ser contrarevoluciónaria, agente, en última instancia, de la burguesía imperialista y de la contrarevolución en las filas obreras. Es decir, por su carácter burocrático, estos partidos, aunque hayan tomado el poder y dirigido una revolución, siguen oponiendose y combatiendo todo desarrollo interno e internacional de la revolución permanente. Dicho de otra forma, siguen siendo enemigos jurados del desarrollo de la revolución socialista internacional aunque hayan dirigido una revolución nacional victoriosa.

Chando ello ocurre se debe a causas objectivas muy concretas y específicas que el propio Trotsky previó en el programa de transición "sin embargo uno no puede categóricamente negar por anticipado la posibilidad teórica que bajo la influencia de circunstancias completamente excepcionales (guerra, derrota, colapso financiero, presión revolucionaria de las masas, etc.) los partidos pequeñoburgueses, incluyendo a los stalinistas pueden ir más allá de lo que ellos mismos desean por el camino de un rompimiento con la burguesía (Trotsky, The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution, Pathfinder, 1973, pág. 95).

Trotsky, sin embargo no dedujo de ello que los partidos stalinistas dejaran de cumplir su rol de traidores y contrarevolucionarios, ni dedujo tampoco que debiamos dejar de combatirlos encarnizadamente.

La derrota de los explotadores de un país llevada a cabo por el stalinismo en esas "circunstancias completamente excepcionales" se dió traicionando a los trabajadores del mundo entero. Es así como la derrota del imperialismo en China, Corea del Norte, Vietnam y Europa del este fue el precio que aquel tuvo que pagar para que el stalinismo domesticase y aplastase la revolución obrera en europa occidental.

Por otra parte, la mayor parte de esos triunfos se concretaron en el mundo colonial, en países periféricos, lo que si bien debilitaba al imperialismo, le permitía recuperarse y sobrevivir con la ayuda del stalinismo y los PC. Al mismo tiempo le permitía al stalinismo reivindicar sus concepciones etapistas y del socialismo en un solo país, y por esa vía seguir consolidándose en el movimiento de masas del mundo entero, como último reaseguro de la propia contraciolución imperialista.

Ese rol traidor del stalinismo mundial, de todos los partidos comunistas del orbe sin excepción, hayan roto o no con Moscú, hayan tomado o nó el poder, se concreta en el rol funesto que han tenido en la domesticación durante más de dos décadas del proletariado industrial del mundo entero. Este rol ha sido directo e indirecto. Directo cuando los PC han sido la fuerza política dominante. Indirecto porque supolítica burocrática detiene la revolución donde

(PG. 10)

- 5 --

tienen influencia y ayudan así a las burocracias sindicales y socialdemócratas de los países donde no la tienen a seguir controlando a la clase obrera.

4. - A pesar de las traiciones stalinistas, el proletariado de los países metropolitanos empezó a levantar cabeza en la Europa occidental. Este acontecimiento histórico, que tiene un solo significado, el comienzo del fin del régimen capitalista-imperialista a escala mundial, llevará a alturas insospechadas el rol traidor de los partidos comunistas de todo el mundo especialmente los de europa occidental.

Haber combatido y denunciado a los partidos comunistas durante décadas como contrarevolucionarios y ahora, que llega el ascenso revolucionario, que podría al descubierto el rol cada vez más traidor de esos partidos, asegurar que los partidos comunistas europeos tienen "una política de transición, qunque nadie sabe hacia donde o hacia qué", como afirma el c. Mandel, es usar un paraguas para los días de sol. Ha llegado la hora de la lucha final e implacable contra los partidos comunistas y socialistas, demostrarlos a las masas, a millones y millones de trabajadores, como partidos traidores y contrarevolucionarios. Ha llegado la hora de intensificar y ampliar la denuncia implacable y sistemática del trotskysmo contra los partidos comunistas y socialistas tradicionales, no de aguarla, olvidarla o aún peor asegurar que no sabemos cuál será su política. Como trotskystas sabemos lo que harán: traicionar más que nunca a la clase trabajadora.

5. - Esta denuncia sistemática no significa ignorar la táctica de frente único ni la crisis en la que estan sumergidos los partidos comunistas. La táctica de frente único para que sea comunista revolucionaria, trotskysta, debe ir acompañada de una clara delimitación y denuncia a los partidos reformistas de masas hacia los cuales se dirige. Así actuaron Lenin y Trotsky frente a los socialistas revolucionarios y a los mencheviques en el 17. Posteriormente esa fue la política de la III Internacional cuando se orientó hacia el frente único con los partidos socialdemócratas: ni un solo minuto dejó de seguir denunciandolos como traidores, al mismo tiempo que los llamaban al frente único. Si no se combina la denuncia más intransigente con el llamada al frente único se termina capitulando a los partidos reformistas.

Una variante - aunque de fundamental importancia - de esta táctica de frente único, debe ser nuestro llamado a la unidad de acción con los partidos reformistas (incluido el PC) contra los intentos del fascismo o de los golpes reaccionarios, que atacan tanto a los revolucionarios como a los reformistas. Este peligro permanente del movimiento obrero en su ascenso, es decir, los putchs fascistas o reaccionários, deben ser combatidos con la política de frente unico mas consecuente, pero dentro de la táctica comunista de frente único, es decir, sin dejar de atacar por un solo minute a los partidos comunistas y socialistas como los verdaderos causantes, por su política, de que el fascismo y la reacción levante cabeza y pueden debido a la política de esos partidos traidores atacar a esos mismos partidos. Es decir, nosotros más que nunca levantamos la bandera del frente único con los partidos reformistas para defender a esos mismos partidos del ataque de la reacción, pero mas que nunca también seguimos denunciando a esos partidos como los principales causantes de que la reacción levante cabeza y los ataque a ellos mismos.

Lo mismo ocurre con la crisis inevitable de los partidos comunistas en todo gran ascenso del movimiento de masas. Hay que distinguir cuidadosamente entre la caracterización de la política de un PC y la de sus crisis. Las crisis de los partidos comunistas es un fenómeno muy positivo porque nos ayuda a despedazar a estos partidos contrarevolucionarios. Pero si alguien confonde la crisis con la política del partido, llega a la aberración de creer que porque un partido traidor ha entrado en crisis, el partido puede dejar de ser traidor y por lo tanto cambiar su política. Quien piensa así ayuda a la dirección burocrática contrarevolucionaria de esos partidos comunistas a superar o paliar la crisis, ya que amortigua la implacable denuncia de ese partido contrarevolucionario para acelerar su crisis, para destruirlo. Un verdadero trotskysta utilíza la crisis de toda dirección burocrática y de todo partido comunista para acelerarla, señalando el caracter de irrecuperables que tienen para la revolución esa dirección y ese partido. Nuestro objetivo es claro y categórico, explicarle a los trabajadores que esa dirección y ese partido comunista están definitivamente perdidos para la revolución, son agentes de la contrarevolución imperialista en las filas del movimiento obrero. Junto con ello tenemos que señalar que justamente por este carácter irrecuperable para la revolución del partido comunista, su crisis es muy positiva porque significa la desaparición, destrucción o aniquilamiento de ese partido, proceso con el cual nosotros estamos de acuerdo y que queremos lograr.

6. - Todo lo que venimos diciendo se está dando milimétricamente en la actual realidad italiana, francesa y española. El partido comunista italiano es hoy día la maxima garantia del orden burgues. De hecho está colaborando de lleno con el gobierno democráta cristiano y con la gran patronal italiana. Las "concesiones democráticas" que le hace a la base del movimiento sindical italiano tienen un objetivo obvio: poder desarrollar mucho mejor su política contrarevolucionaria al servicio del imperialismo italiano. El PC francés se postula, a través de la "Union de izquierda", como el enterrador de la revolución obrera francesa.

Los hechos han confirmado el siniestro rol traidor del PC español. Ha sido la salvaguardia del régimen postfranquista y aún del franquismo. Ha sido el partido que ha logrado impedir que se organice una gran huelga general que derrote al régimen. Es el partido que está liquidando las comisiones obreras para mejor servir al imperialismo español y al régimen. En estos días ha salvado al régimen y Carrillo hace declaraciones públicas en favor de un gobierno de unidad nacional bajo el rey. Tan contento de ello, desvia la justa indignación de los trabajadores contra la aparición de las bandas fascistas hacia manifestaciones que de hecho llevan a apuntalar la política del gebierno español. Pocas veces hemos viste una política más obyecta y traidora. Esto no es más que el principio. Veremos traiciones mucho perores por parte del PCE.

Portugal, a su manero, señala el futuro de todos los partidos comunistas europeos. Allí, el PC trató de entregar los embriones de poder obrero y popular al MFA, un ala del ejercito imperialista, o directamente los combatió a sangre y fuego. Entregó las justas huelgas del movimiento obrero contra el plan de austeridad de Vasco Goncalvez y llamó a apoyar a este plan del gobierno imperialista.

Esto es lo que han hecho los partidos comunistas europeos, y volvemos a insistir, no es nada más que un botón de muestra de lo que harán en el futuro, que no serán más que traictones mucho más horrendas y catastróficas que las que ya llevan hechas. Es decir, la realidad está demostrando que el ataque de tantos años del troi-

skysmo al stalinismo y a los PC era más justificado y la realidad futura demostrará aún más, hasta la sociedad, que son traidores, contrarevolucionarios. Que una de las razones fundamentalesde ser del trotskysmo es el combate más implacable contra los PC y su denuncia como partidos traidores y contrarevolucionarios, al mismo nivel de los partidos socialdemócrates.

III. LAS CONTRADICCIONES DEL COMPANERO MANDEL:

l. - El c. Mandel contradice lo que el mismo escribió o aprobó hace algún tiempo. El documento público de la internacional sobre España es "La Agonia del franquismo" que fue escrito por la TMI orientada por el c. Mandel.

En ese documento, deplorable en sus análysis y política concretos para España, se sostiene una caracterización principista frente al PC. Oigamos al mandelismo hace algo más de un año:

"Durante 20 sãos el Partido Comunista español y sus diferentes aliados han obstinadamente perseguido la estrategia de tratar de obtener el reemplazo de la dictadura con un régimen democrático burgués a través del vehículo de una combinación de hacer presion sobre la burguesía (la "huelga general pacífica") y ofreciendo al gran capital siempro las garantías de colaboración de clase y respeto por el orden burgues. La formación de la Junta Democrática es solamente la última variante de una estrategia única y permanente: convencer a la burguesía española que puede cambiar su sistema político sin que su dominio de clase sea seriamente amenazado".

"El PCE quiere asegurar a la burguesía española que el régimen puede ser cambiado bajo condiciones que pueden dejar intactos no solamente su poder econômico y sus ganarcias privadas sino igualmente su estado y sus instrumentos de represión contra los obreros. Este es el real contenido de su política traidora".

"Mientras los efectos de esta política sobre la burguesía todavía es débil hoy dia no va ser así inmediatamente después de la caída de la dictadura. En este momento una alianza con los reformistas socialdemocraticos, los neosocialdemocratas o los stalinistas puede aparecer a sectores importantes de la burguesía como el último resorte para detener el ascenso revolucionario como un paliativo que no amenace inmediatamente su dominio de clase. Pero la habilidad de los reformistas stalinistas para llevar a cabo este trabajo contrarevolucionario no depende solamente de sus intenciones de orientación política sino también y sobre todo del alcance de la crisis social, del movimiento de masas, así también como del nivel de la conciencia de clase de las masas, el grado de autorganización y centralización que ellas hayan logrado, la relación de fuerzas entre los reformistas y los revolucionarios dentro del movimiento obrero y lo que se haya avanzado en el camino de la construcción del partido revolucionario. (subr. 1 17tro.)

2. - Para "La Agonía del Franquismo" la política del PCE era y seguirá siendo la misma que en los últimos "20 años", una política "contrarevolucionario" y "traidora". Para el mismo documento a medida que ascendiera la revolución, el PC sería más útil a la contrarevolución burguesa. Exactamente lo opuesto a lo que nos dice públicamente hoy día Mandel, oponiendose así a un documento oficial de la Internacional y de su fracción. El c. Mandel debió haber citado y defendido ante los periodistas este documento público de la Internacional y de su fracción. Hubiera pedido actualizarlo dando los ejemplos presentes de las traiciones del PC español y pro-

fetizar las traiciones futuras. En lugar de ello actuó como un hábil abogado defensor del PC español y de los PC europeos.

Al actuar así el c. Mandel comete dos crimenes. No ayuda para nada a la implacable lucha de los trotskystas españoles, franceses e italianos contra las traiciones actuales de los Partidos Comunistas de esos países. En lugar de denunciarlos con signos de admiración se limita a abrir una serie de signos de interrogación sobre el futuro de su política.

El otro crimen es que todo obrero de vanguardia que haya empezado a fustigar al PC por su política traidora y contrarevolucionaria, que haya comenzado a escuchar nuestras criticas, después de leer al c. Mandel le tiene que surgir un gran interrogante: ?debe romper con el Partido Comunista o presionarlo por el contrario para cambiar su política? Todo obrero que se incline a posiciones revolucionarias en Francia, después de leer al c. Mandel, tiene que tener una duda muy grande ?la mejor política no es presionar cada vez más al Partido Comunista para que adopte "el giro revolucionario" que vaticina Mandel si lo presiona suficientemente? Es decir, las conclusiones de las declaraciones del c. Mandel refuerzan las esperanzas y la confianza, ya muy disminuidas, de miles detrabajadores en los Partidos Comunistas Europeos, en lugar de desarrollarlas hasta el fin para que rompan con esos partidos. Las declaraciones del c. Mandel llegan inevitablemente a una orientación que no significa más que la capitulación a los PC europeos.

Creo, compañeros, haber demostrado exhaustivamente la gravedad de las declaraciones del c. Mandel y la necisidad de efectuar una delimitación pública.

Esta delimitación debe ser resultado de un intercambio fraternal de opiniones entre todos los dirigentes, tendencias, fracciones y militantes que seguimos reivindicando el análisis clásico y principista del trotskysmo con referencia a los Partidos Comunistas.

Es decir, podemos cambiar el tono, podemos ver las distintas variantes tácticas que convengan con referencia a esa declaración de crítica a las efectuadas por el c. Mandel, pero lo que se impone es hacerlo para paliar esta verdadera catástrofe que ha ocasionado el c. Mandel a nuestros militantes trotskystas europeos y a nuestra internacional en su conjunto.

Ninguna de estas proposiciones deben ser tomadas como una caracterización y un ataque público o interno al c. Mandel. Acá no estamos juzgando la trayectoria histórica del c. Mandel que merece el mayor de los elogios como uno de nuestros máximos dirigentes durante mán de 30 años, sino estamos juzgando funestas declaraciones públicas para el futuro de nuestra internacional. Así deben ser tomadas.

Con saludos trotskystas ortodoxos y esperando vuestra pronta respuesta,

N. Moreno

Bogotá February 1, 1977

To the Comrades of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

Dear Comrades:

In my capacity as a member of the United Secretariat, as a Trotskyist leader over a period of thirty-five years and an activist for thirty-seven, as a leader of the Bolshevik Tendency and the Socialist Workers party of Argentina, I have decided to take on the responsibility of personally addressing the United Secretariat, the three current tendencies in the International, and all responsible leaders and activists to ask that we make an immediate public disavowal of the statements—which I consider to be revisionist—made by Comrade Mandel to the Barcelona magazine Topo Viejo [Old Mole—translator] and published in Nos. 2 and 3 of that magazine in November and December 1976.

I. The Statements by Comrade Mandel:

l. In the statements we are referring to, Comrade Mandel holds that the European Communist parties have ceased being counterrevolutionary and treacherous, that they are undergoing a transition—"Eurocommunism"—and that it cannot be said how it will end up. A few quotes illustrate this adequately:

"It will also be difficult--I don't say it will impossible but it certainly will be difficult--for the PCE [Spanish CP] to adopt a position clearly favoring strikebreaking, as the PCI [Italian CP] and the PCE itself have done in some periods of their existence. That is because the relationship of forces in the Spanish workers movement is very different."

"The French far left--despite its limitations, weakness, and organizational divisions--today has real political weight and has the potential capacity to force the reformist leadership of the CP to make a revolutionary turn."

"The comrades leading the (Spanish) Communist party, especially the worker cadres, will have to take it on and resolve it, and I hope and trust that they will prove capable of resolving it positively, in the sense that they will return to the path of revolutionary Marxism."

"Eurocommunism is the politics of a transition, although no one knows where or to what it is heading. Perhaps it represents a transition toward the Communist parties being absorbed by the social democracy, something which in my opinion is quite unlikely but not totally excluded. Perhaps it is a transition toward a new Stalinism. And it also could be--why not?--a transition on the part of the worker cadres of the party toward again discovering revolutionary Marxism, Leninism. The political struggle and

practical experience will tell us what is going to happen."

2. According to Comrade Mandel, the future of the European CPs is uncertain and he does not reject the possibility that they might once again become revolutionary Marxist parties. he tells us, "Eurocommunism is the politics of a transition, although no one knows where or to what it is heading ... it could be a transition toward again discovering revolutionary Marxism, Leninism." "The comrades leading the (Spanish) Communist party"; "I hope and trust that they will prove capable of resolving it positively, in the sense that they will return to the path of revolutionary Marxism." "The reformist leadership of the (French) CP" can be "forced to make" "a revolutionary turn." In order to hide his revision and capitulation, Comrade Mandel combines such predictions with expressions like "on the part of the worker cadres of the party," "especially the worker cadres," "leaders of the of the party," "especially the worker cadres," "leaders of (Spanish) CP," and "the French far left" in each of those quotations, respectively. Following the same line of reasoning, he affirms "that the relationship of forces in the Spanish workers movement" is the reason why the Spanish CP cannot be outright strikebreakers.

But such circumstances exacerbate his revisionism and do not conceal it as Comrade Mandel thinks, since that means that the Communist parties can once again become revolutionary because of the pressure from their worker cadres in Spain, from "the far left" in France. To put it another way, the creation of the Fourth International was a tragic historic error since the Communist parties are salvageable for the revolution if the worker cadres, the far left, or the relationship of forces exerts strong pressure on them.

3. Comrade Mandel commits a very grave error; he confuses the role of strikebreakers in economic struggles with a political counterrevolutionary role. Political betrayals are much more serious than the role the CP plays in the trade-union struggles of the workers movement. Many years ago, Comrade Pierre Frank explained how the French CP practices a certain degree of day-by-day defense of the workers in the factories, a certain vanguard leadership role in economic struggles, in order in this way to be able to maintain the prestige that enables it to carry out horrendous political betrayals. Comrade Mandel has not grasped this dialectic of the CPs. What is involved is the CPs' role as political strikebreakers, their role as traitors and political counterrevolutionaries, leaving aside the small or large concessions they gain for the rank and file in the economic struggles of the workers movement. And during 1976 the PCE was tireless in its political betrayals of the Spanish proletariat and oppressed nationalities, and in its playing on the side of the regime, without Comrade Mandel noticing it and feeling obliged to denounce them. The Basque comrades must tell the entire International

Moreno/3

whether Comrade Mandel is correct or not, whether the CP is getting better or worse in the political fights against the regime.

4. What Comrade Mandel does not say in his interview is as serious as what he says. Nowhere does he show that the European Communist parties, especially the Spanish CP, are betraying and will continue increasingly to betray as long as the revolutionary upsurge continues, because that is the function the Communist parties have been conditioned to fill since 1935, since they adopted the strategy of class collaboration and popular fronts with the bourgeoisie.

Nowhere does Mandel speak about the irreversible crisis of the Communist parties, a crisis provoked by the insoluble conflict between their politics and counterrevolutionary leadership and the rise of the mass movement. On the contrary, he systematically insists that he in no way rejects the possibility that the Communist parties, including their leaderships, might move in a revolutionary direction.

Nor does he expose the counterrevolutionary united front between the Kremlin, the CPs, the imperialists, and the Socialist parties. He does not point out that the European CPs are inside that counterrevolutionary united front.

II. The Counterrevolutionary Treacherous Character of Eurocommunism:

l. Only an impressionist could say that there are three possible variants for Eurocommunism—social democracy, Stalinism, and revolutionary Marxism. Eurocommunism is a double adaptation by the Communist parties—to the upsurge of the masses in Europe and to imperialism itself. The adaptation to the mass upsurge has only one goal—to better serve the imperialist counterrevolution. For a Trotskyist, the discussion on Eurocommunism has a limit—the impossibility of the Communist parties and their leaderships becoming revolutionary again. To put it another way, the discussion can only revolve around the formal changes the European Communist parties are making so as to better serve the imperialist—Stalinist counterrevolution during the upsurge of the European revolution.

If the problem is posed in this way, there is only one question to be answered: Are the European Communist parties already neo-Social Democratic or are they still Stalinist? In our opinion they are Stalinist because they maintain their close relationship with the USSR. If there were a war between their imperialists and the USSR we think they would defend the workers state and not imperialism. But since the conflict today is not between the USSR and imperialism, but rather between the revolutionary upsurge and the (imperialistic-bureaucratic) European counterrevolution, the

CPs, like the Socialist parties, form part of that counterrevolutionary front. Therefore, the CPs adopt social democratic
positions for the workers and the mass movement, so as to better
play their counterrevolutionary role. They are closer and closer
to their own imperialists without having reached the point of
being their direct agents, which would convert them into social
democratic parties. But this difference is secondary right now
since in face of the revolutionary upsurge, the social democrats
and European Communist parties are playing a similar role. The
social democracy fills that role closely and directly linked to
its imperialists, and the CPs, via the Kremlin. But the function
is identical—to serve the counterrevolution through class
collaboration.

2. Trotskyism has as one of its reasons for being the implacable struggle against the Socialist and Communist parties, which have gone over to the camp of imperialist counterrevolution and increasingly betray the working class. For Trotskyists, this passing of the reformist parties into the camp of the imperialist counterrevolution is a decisive and irreversible fact that led to the founding of the Fourth International. If it had been possible to change and transform the Socialist and Communist parties into revolutionary parties, first the Third International and later the Fourth International would not have been founded. The Trotskyists state that the Communist parties the world over, and especially in Europe, clearly follow a traitorous policy of popular fronts and collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Can Eurocommunism mean that the CPs are abandoning their popular frontist policy, as Comrade Mandel suggests? We categorically deny that possibility.

The degeneration of both internationals flowed from deep social causes—the bureaucratization of these parties, which provided a solid economic and social base for their reformism and tied them for life, for economic and social reasons, to the camp of the imperialist counterrevolution. Although the process of degeneration of the Third International was different from that of the Second International, in going from the center to the periphery—from the bureaucratization of the CP of the USSR to the national parties—this did not stop it from being a process of bureaucratization and degeneration that marked all the Communist parties. All of them are based on a political and trade—union bureaucracy. Where these parties win mass support this bureaucratization is accentuated, but with "national" characteristics, since this privileged bureaucracy begins to have its own "national market" as the main source of its income, through its trade unions, parliamentary posts, and party apparatus. That is the situation in the Italian, French, Spanish, and Portuguese CPs.

This bureaucratization, this privileged layer, is what makes it impossible for sociological reasons to have a revolutionary regeneration of the national Communist parties.

3. The fact that some Communist parties have taken power or have led a revolution does not mean that they have changed historically and structurally, that they have stopped being counterrevolutionary. The same is true when a privileged trade-

union bureaucracy leads a victorious strike. Just because it has done so does not mean it has stopped being a counter-revolutionary bureaucracy, in the last analysis, an agent of the imperialist bourgeoisie and of counterrevolution in the ranks of the working class. That is, because of their bureaucratic character, these parties, even if they have taken power and led a revolution, continue opposing and fighting against any domestic and international development of the permanent revolution. To put it another way, they continue to be sworn enemies of the development of the international socialist revolution although they have led a victorious national revolution.

When that happens, it is due to very concrete, specific objective conditions that Trotsky himself foresaw in the transitional program: "However, one cannot categorically deny in advance the theoretical possibility that, under the influence of completely exceptional circumstances (war, defeat, financial crash, mass revolutionary pressure, etc.), the petty-bourgeois parties including the Stalinists may go further than they themselves wish along the road to a break with the bourgeoisie." (Trotsky, The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution, Pathfinder, 1973, page 95.)

However, Trotsky did not deduce from that that the Stalinist parties would stop filling their role as traitors and counter-revolutionaries, nor did he deduce that we should stop fighting them mercilessly.

The defeat of the exploiters of a country carried out by Stalinists in such "completely exceptional circumstances" took place while they were betraying the workers of the entire world. Thus, the defeat of imperialism in China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe was the price Stalinism had to pay to domesticate and smash the workers revolution in Western Europe.

In addition, most of those victories took place in the colonial world, in peripheral countries. Although the victories weakened the imperialists, they also made it possible for them to recover and survive with the help of Stalinism and the CPs. At the same time the victories provided the Stalinists with a vindication of their concepts of the revolution by stages and socialism in one country and therefore with a means to continue strengthening themselves in the mass movement through the world—the ultimate insurance for the imperialist counterrevolution.

That traitorous role of world Stalinism--of all Communist parties in the world without exception, whether or not they have broken with Moscow, whether or not they have taken power--is concretized in the lamentable role they have played in the domestication of the industrial proletariat throughout the world for more than two decades. This role has been both direct and indirect. It has been a direct role insofar as the Communist

parties have been the hegemonic political force and indirect because the CPs' bureaucratic policies arrest the revolution where they have influence, thus aiding the trade-union and social-democratic bureaucracy in the countries where the Stalinists don't have hegemony to continue controlling the working class.

4. Despite the betrayals of Stalinism, the proletariat in the metropolitan countries began to raise its head in Western Europe. This historic event, which has only one meaning—the beginning of the end of capitalist—imperialist rule on a world scale—will lead the Communist parties throughout the world, especially the Western European parties, to unheard of lengths in their betrayals.

To have combatted and denounced the Communist parties for decades as counterrevolutionary and now--when the revolutionary upsurge that would reveal the increasingly treacherous role of those parties is upon us--to assert that the European Communist parties have "the politics of a transition, although no one knows where or to what it is heading," as Comrade Mandel states, is to use an umbrella on sunny days. The moment of the final, implacable battle against the Communist and Socialist parties has arrived, the moment to expose them to the masses--to millions and millions of workers--as counterrevolutionary, treacherous parties. The time has come to intensify and extend the systematic, implacable denunciation by the Trotskyists of the traditional Communist and Socialist parties. This is not the time to water it down, forget it, or worse--assert that we do not know what their politics will be. As Trotskyists we know what they will do--betray the working class more than ever.

5. This systematic denunciation does not mean forgetting the united front tactic or the crisis the Communist parties are bogged down in. To apply the united front tactic in a revolutionary, communist, Trotskyist, way, it must be accompanied by a clear delimitation from and denunciation of the mass reformist parties to which it is directed. That is how Lenin and Trotsky acted toward the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks in 1917. Later, that was the policy of the Third International when it oriented toward a united front with the social democratic parties—not for a single minute did it stop denouncing them as traitors at the same time that it called on them to form a united front. If the most intransigent denunciation is not combined with a call for a united front, you end up capitulating to the reformist parties.

A variant of basic importance in applying this tactic of the united front must be our call for unity in action with the reformist parties (including the CP) against fascist attacks or reactionary

coups, which threaten revolutionists as much as they do reformists. This permanent danger to the rising workers movement--that is, fascist or reactionary putschs--must be fought with the most consistent policy of the united front. But it must be fought through a communist application of the united front tactic, which is to say, without halting for a single minute the attack against the Communist and Socialist parties for being the real cause -- because of their policy--behind the fascists and reactionaries raising their heads and their being able--due to the policy of those treacherous parties -- to attack those same parties. That is, more than ever we raise the banner of the united front with the reformist parties in order to defend those very parties from the attack of the reactionaries. But more than ever we also continue to denounce those parties as the main cause behind the reactionaries' raising their heads and attacking them.

The same thing happens with the crisis that inevitably takes place in the Communist parties during any big rise of the mass movement. It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the characterization of the policy of a Communist party and the characterization of its crises. The crises of the Communist parties are a very positive phenomenon because they help us cut these counterrevolutionary parties to pieces. But if someone confuses a crisis with the policy of the party, he can fall into the aberration of believing that because a treacherous party has entered a crisis, the party can stop being treacherous and therefore change its politics. A person who thinks like that helps the bureaucratic counterrevolutionary leadership of those Communist parties to overcome or alleviate the crises, since he moderates the implacable denunciation needed to accelerate the crises of such a counterrevolutionary party and to destroy it. A real Trotskyist uses the crises of any bureaucratic leadership and of any Communist party to accelerate the crises, pointing out that that leadership and party cannot be saved for the revolution. Our aim is clear and unambiguous -- to explain to the workers that that leadership and that Communist party are definitely lost to the revolution, that they are agents of the imperialist counterrevolution in the ranks of the workers movement. Along with that we must point out that, precisely because the Communist party cannot be saved for the revolution. its crisis is very positive because it means the disappearance, destruction, or wiping out of that party, a process we favor and want to bring about.

6. Everything we have been saying is occurring ever so slowly at present in Italy, France and Spain. The Italian Communist party today is the greatest guarantee of the bourgeois order. In fact, it is collaborating in full with the Christian Democratic government and the Italian big bourgeoisie. The "democratic concessions" granted to the ranks of the Italian trade-union movement have an obvious goal—to place the CP in position to better develop its counterrevolutionary policy to serve the Italian imperialists. The French CP, through the

"Union of the Left," presents itself as the gravedigger of the French workers revolution.

Events have confirmed the viciously treacherous role of the Spanish CP. It has been the safeguard of the post-Francoist regime and even of Francoism. It has been the party that successfully prevented the organization of a mass general strike that would overthrow the regime. It is the party that is liquidating the workers commissions so as to better serve Spanish imperialism and the regime. It has saved the regime in the current situation and Carrillo makes public statements favoring a government of national unity under the king. So, pleased with that, the righteous indignation of the workers over the appearance of fascist gangs is diverted into demonstrations that in fact lead to propping up the politics of the Spanish government. Rarely have we seen a more abject and treacherous policy. But this is just the beginning. We will see much worse betrayals by the PCE.

In its own way, Portugal foretells the future of all the European Communist parties. There, the CP tried to turn over the embryos of workers and people's power to the MFA, a wing of the imperialist army. Or it fought them directly with fire and sword. It sold out the just strikes of the workers movement against the austerity plan of Vasco Gonçalvez and called for support to this plan of the imperialist government.

This is what the European Communist parties have done, and, we repeat, it is nothing more than an example of what they will do in the future--betrayals that will be much more horrendous and catastrophic than the ones they have already carried out. That is, history is showing that the Trotskyists' attack of so many years against Stalinism and the CPs was more than justified, and future history will show this to be still more the case--that they are traitors and counterrevolutionaries. It will show that one of the fundamental reasons for being of the Trotskyists is to wage the most inplacable fight against the CPs and to denounce them as treacherous, counterrevolutionary parties, just as bad as the social democratic parties.

III. Comrade Mandel's Contradictions

1. Comrade Mandel contradicts what he himself wrote or voted for some time ago. The international's public document on Spain, "The Death Agony of Francoism," was written by the IMT, which is led by Comrade Mandel.

In that document, which is deplorable in its concrete analysis and policy for Spain, a principled position in opposition to the CP is maintained. Here is what the Mandelists said somewhat more than a year ago:

"For twenty years now the Spanish CP and its various allied have obstinately pursued the strategy of putting pressure on the bourgeoisie (the "peaceful general strike") and of offering big capital ever more sweeping guarantees of class collaboration and respect for bourgeois order in an effort to win the replacement of the dictatorship by a bourgeoisdemocratic regime. The formation of the Junta Democratica is only the latest variant of a single and unchanging strategy: convincing the Spanish bourgeoisie that it can change its political system without its class power being seriously threatened."

"The CP wants to assure the Spanish bourgeoisie that the regime can be changed under conditions that would leave intact not only its economic power and its private property, but even its state and its instruments of repression against the workers; this is the real content of their treacherous policy." [The English original, published in the June 19, 1975, issue of Inprecor, reads: "The leadership of the CP and its allies want....(the rest is the same)--Translator.]

"While the effects of this policy on the bourgeoisie remain weak today, this will not be the case immediately after the overthrow of the dictatorship. At that point, an alliance with the Social Democratic reformists, the neo-Social Democrats, or Stalinists could appear to significant sectors of the bourgeoisie as a last resort in halting the revolutionary upsurge with a palliative that does not immediately threaten their class rule. But the ability of the reformists and Stalinists to carry out this counterrevolutionary work does not depend solely on their intentions [original says: "intentions and political orientation -- Translator], but also and above all on the scope of the social crisis and the mass movement, as well as on the level of the class consciousness of the masses, the degree of self-organization and centralization they have attained, the relationship of forces between reformists and revolutionaries within the workers movement, and the progress made on the road to the construction of the revolutionary party." (Our emphasis.)

2. According to "The Death Agony of Francoism" the PCE's policy was and will continue to be the same as the one they have followed in the last "twenty years"—a "counterrevolutionary," "treacherous" policy. According to the same document, insofar as the revolution is on the upswing, the CP will be more useful to the bourgeois counterrevolution. Exactly the opposite of what Mandel tells us publicly today, in this way going against an official document of the international and of his faction. Comrade Mandel should have quoted and defended this public document of the international and his faction before the journalists.

He could have brought it up to date giving current examples of the betrayals of the Spanish CP and predicted future betrayals. Instead of that, he acted like a slick defense lawyer for the Spanish CP and the European CPs.

By acting in this way, Comrade Mandel commits two crimes. He in no way helps in the implacable struggle of the Spanish, French, and Italian Trotskyists against the current betrayals of the Communist parties in those countries. Instead of denouncing them with exclamation points, he limits himself to a series of question marks about the future of their politics.

The other crime is that any vanguard worker who has begun to attack the CP for its treacherous counterrevolutionary policy, who has begun to listen to our criticisms, after reading Comrade Mandel will find himself faced with a big question--should he break with the Communist party or pressure it to change its policy? Any worker who tends toward revolutionary positions in France, after reading Comrade Mandel must have very great doubts -- isn't the best policy to pressure the Communist party more and more to make "the revolutionary turn" Mandel predicts if it is pressured enough? That is, the conclusions to be drawn from Comrade Mandel's statements reinforce the hopes and confidence, now greatly diminished, of thousands of workers in the European Communist parties, instead of leading them to the logical conclusion of breaking with those parties. The statements of Comrade Mandel inevitably lead to an orientation that only means capitulation to the European CPs.

Comrades, I think I have exhaustively shown the gravity of the statements made by Comrade Mandel and the need to take our distance from them publicly.

This disavowal should be the result of a fraternal interchange of opinions among all the leaders, tendencies, factions, and members. It should be a statement that we continue to support the classical, principled analysis of Trotskyism with regard to the Communist parties.

That is, we can change the tone, we can examine the different tactical variants appropriate with regard to such a declaration criticizing the statements made by Comrade Mandel, but what is necessary is a declaration to counteract the real catastrophe Comrade Mandel has inflicted on our European Trotskyist members and on our international as a whole.

None of these proposals should be taken as a public or internal characterization and attack on Comrade Mandel. In this, we are not judging the historical trajectory of Comrade Mandel, who deserves the greatest praise as one of our top leaders for more than 30 years. Instead, we are judging the impact of lamentable public statements on the future of our international. That is how this should be taken.

With orthodox Trotskyist greetings, awaiting your speedy reply,

April 1, 1977

Dear Comrade Moreno,

We received your letter dated February 1, 1977, on March 21, 1977, and we brought it to the attention of the United Secretariat meeting on March 22-24, 1977.

The matter of Comrade Mandel's interview with the Spanish magazine, Viejo Topo, was quickly cleared up. The United Secretariat was informed that the views attributed to Comrade Mandel by Viejo Topo were not his views, were not expressed by him in the interview, and that he had not had the opportunity to see the text of the interview before it was published. On learning this, the United Secretariat readily decided that the best solution was the one that Comrade Mandel himself had proposed: he would write a correction and ask Viejo Topo to publish it. The comrades of the LCR of Spain also informed us that if this correction was rejected by Viejo Topo, then they would publish it.

The United Secretariat also mandated the Bureau to reply to your letter.

We were astonished that before sending us your letter you did not check in advance with Comrade Mandel to ascertain whether he actually expressed the views attributed to him by Viejo Topo. This was particularly surprising since these views are so contrary to the well-known positions of the Fourth International that have been defended on many occasions by Comrade Mandel. No leader of the Fourth International, for example, has presented the position, either publicly or internally, that the West European Communist parties are changing their counterrevolutionary nature. It seems to us that the matter could have been settled without lengthy polemics, if the precaution of checking the facts had been taken. Besides being an elementary courtesy, this was doubly called for before accusing another comrade of "crimes."

We were even more surprised that the letter we received from you was mimeographed, and that seven weeks had elapsed between the time it was written and the time we received it. Thus there are grounds to assume that it has been given broad circulation. The comrades who received the mimeographed letter were presented with only one side of the argument -- yours -- without having had the opportunity to hear Comrade Mandel's explanation, and without even knowing about the solution that the United Secretariat worked out to deal with the problem. This procedure is highly prejudicial to an objective discussion.

Comrade Mandel is writing a reply to your letter. We will send it to you as soon as it is completed. We insist that it be given the same circulation as your own mimeographed letter. We will make the exchange of correspondence on this matter known to the leaderships of the sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International

Revolutionary greetings, United Secretariat Bureau Dear Comrade Moreno,

Your letter of February 1, 1977, surprised me as much by its contents as by its tone.

You start from the assumption that by making some statements to a Spanish magazine, Viejo Topo, one of the leading members of the Fourth International and of the United Secretariat has "betrayed" Trotskyism. You use a lot of space demonstrating the "betrayal." You circulate these "denunciations" throughout the world movement (hence the mimeographed form of the letter) even before sending it to the United Secretariat (the letter dated February 1, 1977, only reached us on March 19). You even go beyond the organizational limits of the Fourth International and submit that letter to a vote of the young Costa Rican organization, which is not yet affiliated to the Fourth International. Yet you do not take the elementary precaution of first ascertaining whether the ideas which you attribute to comrade Mandel, and which you denounce so violently, are really those of the accused comrade. It is incorrect in and of itself to conduct basic polemics in tendency struggles on the basis of unverified interviews and not on the basis of political documents written by tendencies. An excellent way to educate comrades in the "principled" conduct of discussions among revolutionists, indeed:

For an experienced leader of the movement such as yourself, it would have been elementary to first write me a letter, or even to have called me by telephone and asked: Have you really said what Viejo Topo attributed to you, and is this really your opinion?

This precaution was all the more called for, since you must have read in my first interview published by Viejo Topo the rather unbelievable statement that I was opposed to democratic centralism! You know quite well that this is not my opinion at all. I have consistently defended a strict application of democratic centralism inside all sections of the Fourth International, and inside the F.I. as an international, including in correspondence with you. For this reason alone, you should have been a bit suspicious as to the seriousness with which the editors of the Viejo Topo has summarized a long interview I gave them on the request of the comrades of the Barcelona LCR. You should have inferred from that one example at least this one conclusion: that I hadn't had the opportunity to reread and correct this summarized transcript of my statements before it was printed; otherwise I would never have let such a preposterous statement pass. And you would have been wise to first consult me in order to know what part of the statements attributed to me in relation to "Eurocommunism" correspond or do not correspond with my views.

Instead of acting in such a responsible way, you rushed into violent denunciations, some of whose exaggerated formulas border on the grotesque ("Comrade Mandel commits two crimes.""Comrade Mandel has caused a real catastrophe for our European Trotskyist militants and our International as a whole." For comrade Mandel, "the creation of the Fourth International has been a tragic historical error," etc., etc.).

The question must be raised: why did you act in such a way? And the answer seems obvious: because you were motivated not primarily

by the need to defend the integrity of the Trotskyist program, the image of the Fourth International, or the chances of making rapid progress in its expansion, but exclusively by petty factional considerations. Your desire to make some occasional factional capital by playing on the lack of information of inexperienced comrades took precedence over the need to publicly defend the unity, solidarity, coherence, and programmatic integrity of the Fourth International the world over, especially in Spain, where today we have the greatest opportunities for making rapid progress. In doing this you made a serious error, which the rank-and-file militants will judge. You likewise seriously miseducated some young comrades on the manner in which to conduct political discussions in a revolutionary organization without letting them degenerate into an unprincipled brawl that doesn't teach anybody anything except blind factionalism. We hope that such errors will not be repeated. It is certainly not in the interests of the political discussions that your tendency wants to conduct with the rest of the Fourth International to adopt such behavior. This can only make political clarification more difficult.

You are right to assign great importance to a correct analysis by the Fourth International of the phenomenon of "Eurocommunism" (more correctly, the programmatic and political evolution of such parties as the Italian, Spanish, French, British, Swedish, Belgian, Japanese, Mexican CPs, etc.). You follow all the publications of the Fourth International in that respect, watching with an eagle eye for any signs of "revisionism," as a self-appointed guardian of "orthodox Trotskyism." This should have at least made you conscious of the fact that leading spokespeople of the United Secretariat, of the Fourth International, and I myself have in innumerable writings in a consistent way not left the slightest doubt as to the basically right-wing and pro-capitalist turn of the CP leaderships, a turn which has as its basic thrust the deepening of class collaboration with the imperialist bourgeoisies, even more blatant betrayals of potentially revolutionary mass upsurges than those already committed by Stalinist parties in capitalist countries since the historic turn of the Comintern toward popular frontism in the 1934-35 period.

We have consistently defended these positions for several years. Two years ago we published a document submitted to a meeting of our European Political Bureaus on the evolution of the European CPs in which we characterized this evolution as a process of gradual Social Democratization, but one which had not yet reached the stage of a qualitative transformation of the CPs into classical Social Democratic parties, given the degree of privileged relations they still maintained with the Soviet bureaucracy. We stick to that position today.

On July 13, 1976, I wrote an article for INPRECOR concerning the Berlin conference of Communist parties, in which I said:

"Does this mean that we applaud the success incontestably won by 'Eurocommunism' and 'polycentrism' at the East Berlin conference? This would be to fall into a one-sided and opportunist evaluation of the balance-sheet of this conference.

"First of all, the increased prestige won at low cost by the Berlinguers and companies in East Berlin increases their ability to manipulate and thereby betray the rising proletarian revolution in the West as well as the rising political revolution in the East. Significant evidence for this is provided by the euphoric commentaries of R. Havemann (who is nevertheless an honest, critical, and leftist communist and a fierce opponent of the bureaucracy) published in the July 5 issue of the West German weekly Der Spiegel. Enthusiastic about the 'democratic' professions of faith of the 'Eurocommunist' leaders and hoping for innumerable beneficial repercussions for opposition communists and toilers in the 'people's democracies,' Havemann fails to see the decisive concessions to the bourgeoise. The abandoning of any struggle to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus and the strangling of the self-organization of the masses that is the inevitable consequence of attachment to bourgeoisparliamentary institutions imply the risk of defeat of the socialist revolution in southern Europe."

(INPRECOR, No. 56, July 22, 1976. Our emphasis.)

In September 1976 I was interviewed at length by the editor of the French revolutionary Markist theoretical magazine Critique Communiste on the problems of revolutionary strategy in Western Europe. The interview presented in the September/October 1976 issue (no.8-9) of that magazine. It contains the following passage:

"The Communist parties . . . are bending to the pressure of the bourgeoisie and Social Democracy, for example in their abandonment of the concept of 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' We completely disagree with such concessions and continue to uphold the entire classical Marxist-Leninist polemic against the inadequacies, the formalism, the class character and the indirect, oppressive, and severely truncated nature of bourgeois parliamentary democracy."

And further on:

"The objective results of the policies of the reformists are the following: growing impotence of the left government; inability to meet its promises; rising disillusionment among the masses and the creation thereby of a fertile ground for demobilization and demoralization and the return in force of reaction, whether through violence or even by legal and electoral means. This confirms that we have no choice in the matter: either we extend he mass outflanking toward victory, or else decline and defeat are inevitable."

On January 14, 1977, I spoke in London in the name of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International at the mass rally convened to condemn Healy's slander campaign against comrades Joseph Hansen and George Novack. Intercontinental Press (No. 4, Vol. 15, February 7, 1977) reported that I stated the following:

"Whatever one may think about all the intricacies of socalled Eurocommunism, of which we are of course no friends whatsoever, no apologists -- which we don't cover up -- it is a new stage in the reformist degeneration of these parties, preparation for the deeply counterrevolutionary role of these parties in the coming revolutionary struggles in southern Europe." (Our emphasis.)

Anyone familiar with all these statements, which have been made consistently and continuously for many years, should have at least pondered why suddenly, in between two declarations identical in con-

(PG. 18)

tent, I would tell a Spanish paper in October 1976 the opposite of what I said in Scrtenber 1976 and in January 1977. This should have increased your susticions that the editors of Viejo Topo had misrepresented my views when they condensed a long, detailed analysis into a few paragraphs.

Finally, I must remind you of another important fact from the recent history of the Fourth International. For ten years a protracted discussion has been going on in the Fourth International on the nature of the Chinese and Vietnamese CPs. Members of the United Secretariat and the Fourth International have different opinions on this question. But you are perfectly aware of the position that most leading comrades of the majority, and myself in particular, have consistently defended in the course of this discussion. Given that the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Yugoslav CPs had indeed overthrown capitalism in their own countries at the head of a revolutionary mass movement, albeit with bureaucratic methods and opportunist policies, it was dangerous and would open the road to revisionism to call these parties Stalinist, i.e., parties of the same type as the French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, British, and Swedish CP, which, in our opinion, were unwilling and unable to everthrow capitalism in their countries.

We strongly insisted on the fact that this was not only due to the class collaborationist policies of these Stalinist parties, but in particular to the way in which they recruited and educated their members and cadres, i.e., to the practice and experience of these cadres. People who have been trained exclusively in reformist practice and experience for twenty years are unable to act otherwise, even under "new" and "exceptional" circumstances. (Stalinist parties can only overthrow capitalism in the wake of the Soviet army, which is completely excluded in Western Europe today.)

A representative of your tendency was present during several United Secretariat discussions in which we challenged the comrades of the Liga Socialista of Spain to answer clearly and unequivocally as to whether they thought the Spanish CP would overthrow capitalism in Spain under any circumstances. Our answer was an unequivocal "No." We still wait for an unequivocal answer from the LC.

We note that in your letter of February 1, 1977, you yourself throw confusion on this question by mixing the question of the counterrevolutionary effects of a party's policy on a world scale with the specific question of the revolutionary or counterrevolutionary role of that party in the concrete revolution unfolding in its own country. One can agree with the statement that Maoism plays a counterrevolutionary role on a world scale. But in the third Chinese revolution of 1946-49 the Chinese CP did not play a counterrevolutionary role. It is not "counterrevolutionary" to overthrow capitalism in the most populated country in the world, comprised of one quarter of mankind. We completely deny the ability of the Western European CPs to do the same thing in the ir countries. That's why we think it is misleading, to say the least, to lump them all together in the same category.

There are possibly certain differences in the Fourth International on the question of "Eurocommunism" and how to deal with it. These differences should be discussed thoroughly in the period leading up to the Eleventh World Congress. But they are not situated where you pretend to locate them, Nobody in the leadership of the

Fourth International, and certainly no comrade associated with the IMT, believes that the "Eurocommunist" parties could become revolutionary or centrist parties, that under the pressure of the masses or under the pressure of the changed relationship of forces inside the labor movement between them and the revolutionary vanguard they could lead a proletarian revolution or overthrow capitalism. Neither does anybody believe that the leaderships or bureaucratic apparatuses of these parties could reform themselves or change their social nature in any way whatsoever, so as to enable them to play a revolutionary instead of a counterrevolutionary role. Any attempt to sidetrack the discussion into that channel, i.e., to attribute ideas to comrades that they do not hold, have not held, and which are contrary to their clearly and unambiguously expressed opinions, is completely sterile and factional. In reality, it is a diversion preventing real discussion about real or potential differences.

The potential differences which we can detect in your letter (whether they are real or not will only be determined by further discussion) could revolve around three problems:

- 1) The dynamic of the world crisis of Stalinism, which is stimulated by "Eurocommunism." You make a mistake in stating that, given there are no differences between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy as to what should happen in Western Europe, the concessions of the West European CPs to the imperialist bourgeoisie are acceptable to the Kremlin. Contrary to what occurred in 1934-38 or 1941-47, this time the right turn of the CPs has not been accomplished under instructions from the Kremlin, but has taken forms which at least partially go against the interests of the Kremlin. This turn was initiated by the pressure of specific national situations and social forces in the various imperialist countries, i.e., attempts by the CP bureaucracies to escape from their long-term political isolation, to further insert themselves into the structures of the bourgeois state, to find electoral agreements with the Social Democracy, to be accepted as potential government partners by bourgeois parties, while at the same time making some concessions to the powerful antibureaucratic pressure of the West European working class in a period of increasing mass mobilizations in many countries. This pressure led to changes in CP policies at different moments, with different rhythms, and in different forms (there is not "one," but several "Eurocommunisms"). While this conforms to the Kremlin's line of "peaceful coexistence" in general terms, it also openly hurts the interests of the Kremlin through its repercussions in Eastern Europe and the USSR. We believe you underestimate the effects of the criticisms made by the "Eurocommunists" (be they mild and hesitant) of some of the repressive acts of the Kremlin in Eastern Europe and the USSR. This type of criticism strongly stimulated the opposition in these countries. In fact, contrary to what happened in 1934-38 or 1941-47, this time the turn of the CPs has created a deep, growing, and lasting rift inside world Stalinism, a rift we must exploit.
- 2) There is a need for our movement to take political initiatives of a propaganda and sometimes even an agitational nature in face of the contradictions of "Eurocommunism," initiatives which go beyond the simple combinations which you propose of "denunciation plus united front." Denunciations are necessary. United front initiatives are necessary. But more is possible and necessary today. Our sections should try to widen the cracks in the Stalinist monolith which "Eurocommunism" has created, for example, by forcing the Western European

CPs to defend the victims of bureaucratic repression in the East in a real way, and not simply with lip service. They should also start a big offensive in favor of workers democracy, right of tendency, etc. inside the mass organizations, especially the trade unions controlled by the CPs in Western Europe. To be sure, any success we obtain in this field does not change the nature of the CP bureaucracy, nor does it solve the problem of revolutionary leadership in and of itself. But it helps the building of the revolutionary party by making it easier for revolutionaries to operate, to discuss, debate, and criticize the reformist policies inside the mass organizations. Every battle won for internal democracy in the trade unions is a step forward in the battle against reformism and Stalinism. Today the leaders of "Eurocommunism" are very vulnerable on all these questions. Campaigns by our forces and sympathizers can have a broad response among advanced workers and CP members themselves. These responses and successes increase the chances of a victorious fight against the treacherous policies of the CP leaderships.

3) We are convinced that in the course of a rising mass struggle, in a prerevolutionary and especially a revolutionary situation with stronger and stronger Trotskyist parties with correct policies, serious and deep splits will occur in the mass CPs. Whole layers of Communist working class cadres will be won over to revolutionary Marxism. In fact, it will be impossible to build revolutionary mass parties in Western Europe and to conquer the majority of the working class without winning over important sectors of the proletarian cadres of the CPs.

Discussions around these questions would be very fruitful. Factional quarrels around ideas falsely attributed to comrades are utterly sterile and self-defeating. They contribute neither to the class struggle nor to the building of the Fourth International.

Fraternally yours,

Ernest Mandel

ATTACHMENT B

Material Related to Verjat Resignation and Replacement

Jeudi,24 février

Au Bureau du Secrétariat

Chers camarades,

Je tiens à vous confirmer par écrit, comme souhaité, la décision me concernant dont j'ai pu m'entretenir il y a déjà quelques temps avec certains d'entre vous. Pour des raisons de convenance personnelle il m'est devenu difficile voire impossible de maintenir mon appartenance aux instances dirigeantes de l'Internationale. Les camarades de la section française sauront utiliser la place ainsi laissée vacante.

Salutations,

Verjat

Paris, le 24 février 1977

Au Secrétariat unifié de la IVème Internationale

Chers camarades,

Comme vous devez le savoir le camarade Verjat a démissionné de ses responsabilités internationales, pour des raisons à la fois personnelles et professionnelles. Il n'est donc plus membre ni du CEI ni du SU.

Selon les statuts nous avons le droit de demander la substitution d'un camarade dans les instances de direction de l'Internationale, avec l'accord de ce camarade et l'agrément de la section concérnée. C'est ce que nous souhaitons faire officiellement par la présente lettre en vous demandant de bien vouloir faire suite à notre demande de remplacement du camarade Verjat par la camarade Allio, membre de la commission Femmes internationale et transférée depuis plus d'un an de la LMR, section suisse, à la LCR, section française. Pour des motifs qui sont liés aux responsabilités et aux fonctions de la camarade Allio, nous pensons que la camarade peut pleinement assumer la charge d'être membre à part entière du CEI. La camarade Allio est d'ailleurs d'accord avec cette opinion de la direction de la LCR.

Nous vous prions de faire passer cette substitution dans les faits le plus rapidement possible en conférant à la camarade Allio tous les droits statutaires qui sont ceux d'un membre du CEI.

Recevez, chers camarades, nos fraternelles salutations. Le secrétariat du Bureau politique de la LCR (sfq:). TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

Thursday, February 24.

To the United Secretariat Bureau

Dear Comrades.

I would like to confirm in writing, as requested, the decision concerning myself which I was able to discussion with some of you some time ago. For reasons of personal expedience it has become difficult, if not impossible, for me to maintain my membership in the leading bodies of the International. The comrades of the French section will be able to use the place thus left vacant.

Greatings,

Verjat

Paris, February 24, 1977

To the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

Dear comrades,

As you must know, comrade Verjat has resigned from his international responsibilities for both personal and professional reasons. He is therefore no longer a member of the IEC or the US.

According to the statutes, we have the right to ask the substitution of a comrade in the leading bodies of the International, with the agreement of this comrade and the agreement of the section concerned. We would like to do so officially with this letter, by asking you to follow up on our request for the replacement of comrade Verjat by comrade Allio, member of the International Women's Commission who transfered more than a year ago from the LMR, Swiss section, to the LCR, the French section. For reasons relating to the responsibilities and functions of comrade Allio, we think that the comrade can fully assime the responsibility of being a full member of the IEC. Further, comrade Allio agrees with this opinion of the LCR leadership.

We ask you to enact this substitution as quickly as possible, granting comrade Allio all the statutory rights proper to a member of the IEC.

Fraternal greetings,

The Secretariat of the LCR Political Bureau

Attachment B (continued)

April 2, 1977

To the Secretariat of the Political Bureau of the LCR

Dear Comrades,

We received your letter of February 24, 1977 and discussed it at the United Secretariat meeting of March 22-24, 1977. The Bureau was asked to reply.

According to the statutes, only the IEC has the power to elect replacements for former members of the IEC. Thus, we could not fulfill your request to elect Comrad# Allio in place of Comrade Vergeat, who has resigned from the IEC.

However, the United Secretariat agreed with your motivation that, in view of Comrade Allio's international responsibilities, she should be fully involved in international discussions on the leadership level. The United Secretariat therefore decided to regularly invite her to attend United Secretariat meetings.

Revolutionary greetings,

Galois, For the United Secretariat Bureau

ATTACHMENT C

Materials Related to Letter from Three BT Members in LCR

Paris 17 Marzo 1977

Camaradas del SU de la 4º Internacional

Nos dirigimos a ustedes para protestar por una situacion que consideramos atentatoria a nuestros derechos como tendencia internacional.

Hace aproximadamente cuatro meses nosotros entregamos a la LCR (seccion francesa de la 4º Internacional))el texto de declaracion de tendencia de la TBI. Este no ha sido publicado hasta el dia de hoy a pesar que los plazos de realizacion del XI Congreso de la Internacional se acercan. Para llenar este vacio, nosotros invitamos al camarada Moreno para que este visione el Este de la Internacional se acercan. viniera a Francia a hacer una reunion de informacion sobre las posiciones de nuestra tendencia.

Nosotros pedimos permiso al BP de la LCR para realizar esta reunion, quien se ha negado a autorizarla.

El BP nos ha informado que el camarada M reno solo puede dirigirse a una reunion de la TBI francesa. Ustedes comprenderan que esta posicion es inaceptable: como vamos a constituir la TBI en Francia si los militantes de la LCR no pueden conocer las posiciones de nuestra tendencia.

Nosotros apelamos al SU para que ustedes actuen en el sentido de evitar este tipe de posiciones que al limitar los derechos democraticos de nuestra tendencia, ponen un obstaculo al desarrollo de el debate internacional dentro de un cuadro comun.

Saludos comunistas

Carlos Andres Cristobal Attachment C (continued)

March 24, 1977

To: Comrades Andrés, C rlos and Cristobal LCR, France

Dear Comrades,

We have received your letter of March 17, 1977.

It is entirely proper to insist on the prompt translation, publication and distribution of material submitted to the preworld-congress discussion. This corresponds to a decision of the United Secretariat. We have been informed by the LCR leadership that the Bolshevik Tendency declaration will be published and distributed in the coming days.

It is also our understanding that the LCR accepts the right to hold meetings of the announced members or applicants for membership in the existing international tendencies or factions.

Your request, however, was for a broader meeting open to LCR members in general. It is the right of the LCR Political Bureau to regulate such meetings. It is desirable that the broadest possible oral debate be organized in the sections during the pre-world-congress discussion period. However, all sections, through their duly elected leadership bodies, have the ight to determine when and how to organize general assemblies or other internal meetings open to the membership as a whole for disassion of the issues in debate in the pre-world congress discussion, in conformity with the unanimous decision of the October, 1976 United Secretariat meeting.

Comradely yours, The United Secretariat

cc: LCR Political Bureau

Attachment D

MATERIALS RELATED TO RMOC

Socialist Union Document

December 7, 1976

The Struggle for An American Sympathizing Section

Almost a half century after the founding of the left opposition in the U.S., this not unimportant country is a void on the map of the Fourth International. Nothing remains but fragments--small local groups and individuals, for the most part demoralized and disoriented. The task of building a viable sympathizing section of the FI must begin virtually from scratch.

We are aware that this assessment is not shared by the leadership of the IMT, which persists in deluding itself that one of its strongest sympathizing sections (though not affiliated) exists here, i.e., the SWF. Indeed, this fantastic notion contributed directly to the destruction of what could have been a starting point for the rebuilding of the movement and continues to constitute a serious obstacle to the acheivement of that poal.

The pertinent facts and conflicting views on the "American Question" are incorporated in the documents that follow. Some additional observations and conclusions, however, are necessary.

In our reply to Joanna, we have examined the results of the line of the INT leadership after two years of its application. We think the results are undebatable. From any point of view-numbers, cohesiveness, morale--there is only precipitous decline. The tendency--as predicted--has been wrecked.

Yet, there seems to be no thought of a reevaluation, let alone a reorientation. Why?

Apparently, these worthy comrades see some positive result more weighty than the fate of the IMT tendency. This result, we assume, is the continued (fraternal) association of the SWF. Thus, the 4th can still boast of a strong prestigeous sympathetic organization in the US. We have no doubt that a related consideration is the continued "unity" of the 4th Int'l., i.e., the avoidance of another split and the resulting damage to its reputation.

These would be serious considerations (although they would not justify the liquidation of the revolutionary Marxist tendency) if the SMF really performed as a Trotskyist organization, and if the "unity" had any substance. But the reality is exactly the opposite. The SMF has pursued anti-Trotskyist policies in the most critical world events of these two years (Fortugal and Angola) so that its association with the 4th has brought only shame on the Internat'l., while the "unity" is a fraud and everybody knows it.

Just in case the latter wasn't crystal clear, Larnes, at the recent convention of the SWF denounced the Internat'l. leader-ship, declared contemptuously that the SWF would ignore all the rules of the Internat'l. and do just as it pleases, and then concluded by calling on the assembled delegates to tell the leader-ship of the 4th Internat'l. to "go to hell!"--with the unanimous

approval of the delegates! This then is the payoff, the quid-pro-quo received by the ILT leadership for its assistance in scuttling the I.T.

But some comrades will probably contend that the demise of the I/T. proves that it was not viable and, thereby, justifies, the SWF orientation. To begin with, this presupposes that the SWP offers a real alternative, and as we have already demonstrated, this is a totally baseless supposition. But aside from that, this argument comes under the heading of self-fulfilling prophecies. It ignores the plain fact that the collapse of the I.T. was the direct result of the intervention of the IMT leadership. There is every reason to believe that had the center kept its hands off altogether, there would be today a small, but functioning national organization, with a press and a presence on the left, an instrument for the promulgation of the program of the 4th Internat'l., a factor in the debate within the American left, and a pole of attraction for young revolutionaries dissatisfied with the various centrist formations, (Maoist, etc.). The SWP offers no attraction at all for such elements.

It must now be acknowledged that the attempt to build a national organization through the formation of NMOC did not succeed. What would have been possible for 150, especially had they received political and moral backing from the International leadership, was impossible for 50 comrades totally cut off from any contact with the center and finally subjected to a public repudiation by Ernest Mandel together with Jack Barnes (details in enclosed documents) and censorship by the leading bodies of the International.

To this must be added that objective conditions (far from moving toward mass radicalization which would swell the ranks of the SWP by 5,000 workers, according to calculations in Erussels), have deteriorated further. Massive political apathy continues to prevail among the workers, while the students have become conservatized and depoliticized. The combination of these objective and subjective factors proved too unfavorable for the consolidation of a new national organization on such a narrow basis.

The SVP obviously constitutes a formidable obstacle to the building of a genuine Trotskyist movement here. What must be understood is that this is for us a "given," i.e.,, an objective factor working against us and beyond our abulity to influence now, or in the near future. Our movement will have to be built in struggle against it.

What we are concerned with here is the role of the leadership of our international movement, which has, through its stubborn persistance in a patently false and ruinous policy, itself become an obstacle to the building of a section in the US.

An appraisal of this policy is developed quite extensively in the appended document.

What must be looked into is the fact that these comrades, after all the bitter experience and costly lessons have learned nothing. They are seemingly determined to run their line out to the very end, i.e., to the total obliteration of our tendency--

Why?

The simple answer would be to attribute this to a lack of astuteness. But we find this unsatisfactory. It is not possible that comrades who are so clear, even brilliant in other respects, could be so dense on this question. We think the answer is to be found in a far more serious deficiency. We suggest that the inability to make a correct assessment of the SWF, and to draw the necessary conclusions results from a subordination of politics and long term interests to immediate organizational considerations.

The I.T. was admittedly politically correct, but the SWP had the numbers, resources and recognition. The center concluded that it was more important to retain the association with the SWF (even though nominal and one sided) than to support its own political adherants which would have risked a split. But since this course had to be justified politically it became necessary to paint the SWP in "revolutionary" and "Trotskyist" colors. To recognize it for what it really is would have clearly revealed its policy to be politically false and practically inoperable.

We suspect that this same prediliction to conciliate centrist movements for the sake of imagined organizational benefits was responsible for the derailment of our Latin American movement. If we are correct, then this is a problem not only for us, but the entire movement.

As to what to do next in the U.S.--from where we stand in the middle of the wreckage, no clear and obvious answer presents itself. It is possible that new left moving currents will appear, or new directions taken by old ones, and we should keep a close watch on all developments in the American left.

However, at this point there appear to be no shortcuts. The small local groups that continue to see in the F.I. the only axis for the assembling of the vanguard of the world proletariat must set their sights on the rebuilding of the American section, confident that in the long run, the logic of the class struggle and the correctness of our ideas will work in our favor. Our task, in general terms, now is to proceed with intensive studies of American capitalist society and especially of its working class, develop a discussion around these questions, assemble cadres one by one around our program and aim for a marxist journal which would enter the struggle for ideological supremacy on the left. A thorough discussion of the character and evolution of the SWP is also unavoidable, much as some comrades find this disagreeable.

The situation is not a happy one, but it is not the first time that Marxists have found themselves in this predicament. The road would be far easier if we could count on political and moral aid from our international co-thinkers, but unfortunately this is not in the offing.

The Joanna letter of May 13th 1976, was the first real communication we received since the formation of NACC, and it aroused some hopes here. It was proposed that the center would demand of the SWF "fusion" with NACC, and promptly grant some kind of recognition should the SWF refuse (which was a certainty). We welcomes the opening and wrote a lengthy reply on June 22, setting forth our position and promising full coopera-

tion.

Unfortunately the Joanna letter was just words with no serious intention of following through. After several weeks we received a note explaining that the comrades were on vacation so a reply would have to wait several more weeks. Almost six months have passed without a word or deed. Meanwhile, we were urged (in a conversation with a comrade vacationing in Europe) to propose fusion with the SMP, with the promise that the center would "back us up"--in complete contradiction to the strong suggestion in the Joanna letter that it would be far better if the fusion initiative came from Brussels, and with which we concurred. We had deferred, and waited for some motion--but nothing happened.

For us to propose once again unification, integration, reintegration or fusion is simply rediculous. The IT and USec demanded "reintegration" after the expulsion tow and a half years ago with results that are well known. Socialist Union, Kevolutionary Harxist Collective and Baltimore Harxist Group all applied for admission to the SWP in 1974, and were all rejected. RMOC proposed collective admission immediately following our initial conference in October 1975. The SWF did not even bother to acknowledge our communication. In July 1976 we wrote another letter to the SWP reminding the Political Committee of our October application for membership and requesting to send an observer to its national convention (to which groups opposed to the FI were invited). Again we did not receive a reply. We don't believe that one more letter from us and one more rebuff is going to change anything. We have played that game out to the end.

What is required now, is a move by the center which proceeds from the reality that the SWF has illegally expelled the pro-IMT supporters in the US and has in fact refused to cooperate in the unification of all supporters of the FI in the US. This incontestable fact fully justifies the center in taking the initiative in the reassembling of the scattered forces of the IMY in the US and establishing a close relationship with them.

This would of course signify a sharp turn in the American policy of the $I \cap I$. These documents are being circulated for the purpose of bpening a discussion aimed at bringing about such a change.

Socialist Union

F.S. This material and the information contained herein, should only be shared with reliable Int supporters.

ATTACHMENT D (Cont'd)

Judi S. Letter to Mat'l. Coordinators

RECC--Los Angeles September 23, 1976

To: Nat'l. Coordinators

Dear Comrades,

The time has come to face reality--NaCC, as a national organization, no longer exists. Financial and Inprecor reports tell the statistic side. Washingron is orienting toward YAWF, New York and Chicago groups have ceased to exist, and others have, not without reason, lost all confidence in NACC as a viable organization. It's time to acknowledge that the combination of unfavorable circumstances and the opportunist stupidity of our "friends" have proved fatal to our project.

Yet, we think that any hope of a perspective in either the SWP or YAWF is completely illusory--except for those who are able to survive like the chamelean, by adapting to the coloration of either of these two non-Trotskyist formations. YAWF would no more tolerate a genuine Trotskyist tendency in its midst than would the SWP.

We see, then, no alternative other than that local groups: a) develop a serious study of the American class struggle, drawing in all who are interested, b) circulate Inprecor and other FI literature, c) participate in coalition actions, d) consult with and guide individuals and groups which are active in trade union work and mass organizations, e) seek to coalesce with other independent Marxist groups and individuals in order to develop a broader grouping, and f) develop a national discussion through bulletins around the problems of the American class struggle.

This leads inevitably to certain organizational conclusions: 1) whether the name kMOC is to be continued or abandoned; to recognize that it is simply a loose association of Trotskyists who adhere to the general line of the FI, 2) we end the pretense of a national dues system; of the approximately 9900. in the treasury, \$500 is being sent to Inprecor toward our bill. More money may have to be sent. Any balance would be left intact, for now. 3) There is no need nor basis for a national conference at this time. 4) The function of the L.A. based committee would be limited to circulating information and, perhaps, maintaining contact with co-thinkers. 5) houston would perform the important function of coordinating the discussion and circulating the contributions. There should be a discussion on these proposals, and at the conclusion, a comprehensive statement should bedrawn up summarizing the entire experience of the IT-NF-RMOC, the role of the IMT leadership, etc., and this, together with the exchanges with Erussells, be circulated as widely as possible throughout the IMT.

One more thing. At our May conference, we decided to write a letter to the SWP proposing fusion. The letter was drawn up (by Wilt) and was about to be sent when we received the Joanna

letter urging that we leave it to them. The deferred. The InT leadership did nothing about it, and it now up es that we should propose fusion and collaborate in the 3dr election campaigns, while it promises "strong support" for such an initiative.

We, in L.A., are of the opinion that this game has been played out to the point where it is now a bad joke. $\underline{\textit{we}}$ know that it is absurd, and anyone who still needs to be educated on that question is a hopeless fool. We are through with that farce.

Furthermore, it is our opinion that it is time to say openly what most of us have believed for a while now--certainly since Portugal--namely, that the SWP is neither revolutionary nor Trotskyist--generally or specifically; that it has definitively degenerated into a hardened, monolithic left Social Democratic organization; that it is beyond redemption, that it has, indeed, become a powerful obstacle to the formation of a Trotskyist movement in this country. A corallary of this is that, by bolstering this anti-Trotskyist gang and collaborating with it in smashing a pro-FI tendency, the InT leadership has performed a terrible disservice to the world movement.

To sum up then, we offer the following proposals for consideration, and urge you to respond, following discussion in your local areas, as soon as is possible.

- 1) That we attempt to keep together the pro-IMI current in this country;
- since RMOC, as a national organization, no longer exists. we leave it to the discretion of individual groups to decide on a name:
- 3) we discontinue the nat'l. dues system, but keep intact the remainder of the national treasury, at least for now;
- 4) we abandon the idea of a national conference at this time:
- 5) that L.A. act as a center for circulating information and maintaining contact with co-thinkers;
- 6) that Eouston coordinate the discussion and circulate contributions nationally:
- 7) we continue to distribute Inprecor; L.A. will coordinate financial responsibilities as before, if requested;
- 8) we send \$200 to Inprecor to offset their financial crisis:
- 9) wherever possible, we engage in a serious study of the American class struggle, drawing in all who are interested; that this study generate a discussion nationally, through our bulletins, with the aim of drawing certain conclusions pertaining to the unfolding of the coming American revolution;
- 1) we abandon the idea of sending a letter to the SWF proposing fusion;

ll) and finally, there should be a thorough discussion, followed by a comprehensive statement, covering the entire experience of our tendency, the role of the LT leadership, etc., with the aim of circulating this finished statement as widespread as possible throughout the $\rm IMT$.

We are enclosing copies of a letter from cde. Fred in Houston.

Some of the points raised in his letter are answered in the above statement from the NAC. However, the point concerning the Inprecor debt should be re-emphasized. L.A. has been paying Inprecor bills whether or not locals have sent in their money. Cde. Fred is absolutely right to point out that bundles should either be sold, and paid for, or given to those who can make use of them. If bundles are not being sold, then they should be reduced to a more reasonable amount, but in any case, whatever amount is ordered needs to be paid for.

Cde, Fred also refers to a meeting between Jones of the IMG and cde. Hedda. A note has been written to cde. Hedda asking for a report of this meeting, and will be included with this coordinator's letter.

Comradely,

Judi S.

ATTACHEENI D (cont'd.)

hedda Garza Letter to United Secretariat

January 50, 1977

Dear Comrades,

This is to inform the United Secretariat that an application for immediate membership in the Socialist Workers party has been made by the comrades listed below. All of these comrades were former members of the Internationalist Tendency of the SWP or YSA, and all of them were expelled from the SWP and/or YSA in July 1975. At some point in the past year and a half, they all joined NLOC. Most of them applied for readmission (or admission) the SWP within a few months after the expulsion, but none of them were readmitted.

In May 1976, a meeting of the NMOC Sterring Committee took place in Chicago. It was agreed that AMOC should apply for fusion with the SMP. It became increasingly clear, however, to some of us, that Rmoc would have to take a position on the character of the SMP. On Spetember 23, the Los Angeles RMOC comrades sent a letter to the steering committee members in which they characterized the SMP as "...neither revolutionary nor Trotskyist..." The RMOC comrades in New York met to discuss this letter and sent a reply to Los Angeles on Hovember &, breaking its ties with kBOC. They also voted to apply collectively to the SMF and to urge other comrades nationally to join with them.

On January 14, I met with Comrade Linda Jenness of the SWF to discuss our application. I informed her of the above facts and sent her a copy of the New York letter to L.A. (attached). Comrade Jenness asked me if the comrades who had individually applied in 1974 were withdrawing their individual applications, and I told her that since it was over two years and they had not been readmitted, they were substituting their collective application instead. Comrade Jenness informed me that she would contact me after the Political Committee of the SWF discussed the matter.

This letter, then, is to officially inform the USEC that the comrades below are no longer members of MCC, do not agree with the L.A. characterization of the 3MF, but believe that the 3MF is the revolutionary party in the United States and are accordingly requesting membership or, in the case of former members, readmission collectively to the 3MF. When we hear from other comrades, we will send you their additional names.

Comradely.

Hedda Garza

New York: Eill B., Charles P., Dan C., bob J., John E., Eugo, Ernest L., Charles k., Houston: Fruce C.

Attachment D (continued)

Galois, Johnson Statement on the RMOC

We voted for the motion on the RMOC because we agree with the decision it makes concerning the RMOC. Our vote in no way implies agreement with the February, 1976 IEC motion on the IT. We voted against the motion at the time, and we have not changed our view.

[Note: Attachment E is not included since it was subsequently printed in IP. See IP, Vol. 15, #15, April 25, 1977.]

[Minutes continue on page 37.]

ATTACHMENT F

Materials Related to OCRF! Motion

au Secrétariat Unifié de la VO Internationale

Paris, le 7 de Mars 1977

Camarades,

Nous vous confirmons que nous sommes prêts à l'organisation d'un débat public entre le Secrétariat Unifié de la IV Internationale et le Comité d'Organisation pour la reconstruction de la IV Internationale, et nous sommes naturellement d'accord pour la réunion que vous proposez. Nous attendons que vous en fixiez la date.

Pour ce qui est de l'autre point que vous soulevez dans votre letter, le camarade Lambert ne contest nullement avoir dit que l'O.C.I. s'était donné les moyens de suivre les débats politiques qui avaient lieu dans la L.C.R. Et cela dans la mesure où le type de relations existant entre la L.C.R. et l'O.C.I. ne permettaient pas d'autre solution. D'ailleurs, la L.C.R. de son côte ne se refuse pas à avoir recours au même moyen--et cela nos somble inévitable. Le cas du camarade Carasso de Clermont-Ferrand est, de ce point de vue, illustratif.

Ce sont des problèmes dont nous pensons au'ils disparaîtront d'eux-mêmes pour peu que le débat politique que nous souhaitons s'ouvre véritablement.

Pour le Bureau International du Comité d'Organisations pour la Reconstruction de la IV Internationale,

F. de Massot

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

Paris, March 7, 1977

United Secretariat of the Fourth International

Dear Comrades,

This is to confirm that we are prepared to organize a public discussion between the United Secretariat of the Fourth International and the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International, and that we of course agree to the meeting you have suggested. We are only waiting for you to set the date.

As for the other point you rake in your letter: Comrade Lambert in no way denies having said that the OCI had found ways of following the political discussion in the LCR-given the type of relations that existed between the LCR and the OCI, no other solution was possible. The LCR, for that matter, has not hesitated to resort to the same method--Comrade Carasso from Clermont Ferrand is a case in point. It seems to us that this is inevitable.

These are problems we think will take are of themselves once the political discussion, which we are tooking forward to, really gets underway.

F. de Massot

For the International Bureau of the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International.

OCRFI MOTION

Conformément aux motions adoptées antérieurement sur les relations avec le CORQI, et suite à la réponse du CORQI à ces propositions, le SU decide:

- l. De tenir dans les plus brefs délais une réunion avec une délégation du CORQI pour examiner les modalités du débat public entre ce dernier et le SU de la IVe Internationale.
- 2. De fixer comme premier thème de ce débat: la crise du stalinisme.
- 3. De procéder à la préparation de ce débat public et écrit selon les modalités suivantes:
 - a. La présentation des positions de la IVe Internationale dans ce débat doit s'effectuer sous le contrôle du SU;
 - b. Le bureau du SU est mandaté pour préparer dans le cadre de ce débat public un projet de texte à présenter au SU:
 - c. Afin d'éviter d'initier la discussion à partir de positions préétablies, ce texte doit être le résultat d'un processus de discussion réelle au sein des organes de direction de l'Internationale. De cette manière pourront être définies les positions de fond de l'Internationale et les désaccords qui peuvent se manifester dans tel ou tel domaine;
 - d. Dans les conditions d'accomplissement de cette procédure, le SU permettre la possibilité d'expression publique de divergences s'étant manifestée en son sein;
 - e. Après un bilan à la fois de ce débat et des éventuelles actions communes, le SU décidera des formes de la poursuite du débat.
- 4. Afin d'examiner les problèmes attachés à la réalisation matérielle de ce débat public et écrit, une réunion se tiendra entre le secrétariat du BP de la LCR, des représentants de la direction du SWP et le Bureau du SU.
- 5. Dans sa lettre du 7.3.77 addresée au SU de la IVe Internationale, le CORQI affirme. "le camarade Lambert ne conteste nullement avoir dit que l'OCI s'était donné les moyens de suivre les débats politiques qui avaient lieu dans la LCR. Et cela dans la mesure où le type de relation existant entre la LCR et l'OCI ne permettalent pas d'autres soltuions."

Le SU décide de publier cette lettre dans le Bulletin interne international, accompagné d'une réponse du BP de la LCR. La délégation du SU est mandatée pour mettre ce point à l'ordre du jour de sa prochaine rencontre avec la délégation du CORQI.

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

In accordance with the motions previously adopted on relations with the OCRFI, and after receiving the OCRFI's response to these proposals, the USFI decides:

- To hold a meeting with an OCRFI delegation as soon as possible to consider the modalities of the public discussion between the latter and the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.
- To establish as the first topic in this discussion: The Crisis of Stalinism.
- To proceed to prepare this public, written discussion in the following way:
- The presentation of the positions of the Fourth International in this discussion must take place under the control of the United Secretariat;
- The Bureau of the USFI is mandated to prepare a draft document for this public discussion to present to the USFI;
- c. In order to avoid beginning the discussion from pre-established positions, this document should be the result of a process of real discussion within the leadership bodies of the International. In this way the basic positions of the International can be determined, as well as any disagreements that may arise in this or that area;
- In the framework of carrying out this procedure the USFI will allow the public expression of differences that might exist within it;
- e. After a balance sheet of both the public discussion and possible common actions is drawn the USFI will decide on the forms for continuing the discussion.
- In order to consider the problems related to the practical realization of this public, written discussion, a meeting will be held between the Bureau of the United Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Political Bureau of the LCR, and representatives of the SWP leadership.
- 5. In its letter of March 7, 1977, addressed to the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, the OCRFI asserts: "Comrade Lambert in no way contests having said that the OCI had taken measures to follow the political discussions held in the LCR. This was done since no other solutions are possible, given the type of relations that exist between the LCR and the The USFI decides to publish this letter in the Interna-OCI. tional Internal Discussion Bulletin, accompanied by a response from the Political Bureau of the LCR. The USFI delegation is mandated to take this point up at its next meeting with the OCRFI delegation.

Galois, Johnson statements on the OCRFI motion

We voted for the motion on the OCRFI, because it represents a step forward towards opening up a process of discussion between the USFI and the OCRFI. We still think it would have been preferable to have initiated an internal discussion rather than a public one. We also think it would have been preferable to have suggested a few more topics to initiate the discussion; such as women's liberation and the Latin American revolution, in addition to the crisis of Stalinism.

TRANSLATION

Report on the Central American Trotskyist Conference

By Roberto Torres

A conference of sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International in Central America was held March 14-16, 1977, under the auspices of the Liga Socialista Revolucionaria (LSR--Revolutionary Socialist League) of Panama and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT--Revolutionary Workers party) of Costa Rica.

The hosts opened the conference by pointing out that the central objective was to "arrive at agreements for strengthening the Fourth International in Central America." A three-point agenda was proposed: (1) a report by each of the organizations present on the situation in their respective countries and on "their political positions and their experiences." (2) A report by Alfonso Ríos (who functioned as a representative of the United Secretariat and of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores of Mexico) on the United Secretariat's plans for coordinating the work of the Central American organizations. And (3) a report on perspectives for joint work.

Members of the following Trotskyist organizations were present: Bloque Socialista (BS--Socialist Bloc), Colombia; Liga Marxista Revolucionaria (LMR--Revolutionary Marxist League), Nicaragua; Liga Obrera Comunista (LOC--Communist Workers League) Colombia; Liga Socialista (LS--Socialist League), Mexico; Liga Socialista Revolucionaria, Panama; Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (OST--Socialist Workers Organization), Costa Rica; Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, Costa Rica; Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, Mexico. Comrade Greco was also present. He is formally a member of the Mexican PRT and (as he explained to me), a member of the leadership of the Bolshevik Tendency in the Fourth International.

The OST of Costa Rica

The first report the conference heard was from the OST of Costa Rica, given by a comrade from that organization.

Apparently the ultrasectarianism that various Trotskyist organizations in Central America and elsewhere have practiced toward the OST has begun to break down. During the conference no one objected to the presence of leading members of the OST, although we were informed that the member of the Nicaraguan LMR who was present had some reservations that weren't raised. These perhaps influenced his decision to remain simply an observer and not present a report.

The relevant points of the report by the comrade from the OST where the following: The situation in Costa Rica is marked by growing instability. This is shown by the increasing attacks on the standard of living of the population, the monopolization of the land

in the hands of the landlords, the high level of unemployment, and the government's budget deficit. As a result, there have been a number of important conflicts in which sectors of the workers and their allies have mobilized for their demands. Outstanding among these are the strike by the electrical workers of the Institute Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE-Costa Rican Institution for Electricity, the state electric company), and those by the agricultural workers in the banana and sugar-cane industries. In the ICE strike, the government made a great display of its newest repressive equipment, and a police bullet tore off the leg of a worker during the strike.

The rise in the price of coffee on the world market has given a certain respite to the private companies, and they have gained a margin of maneuver in the negotiations over the workers' demands. But in the state sector, in view of the growing public debt of the government, there has been intransigence on demands such as higher salaries and appropriations for education, medical services, welfare assistance, etc.

There has also been a growing series of attacks on democratic rights, rights that are valued highly by the Costa Rican people. The police have been significantly reinforced with new repressive equipment. The possibility of amending the constitution to allow for the creation of a standing army has been raised. Costa Rica hasn't had such an army up to now. Another case has been the expulsion of two foreigners for political reasons, and the harassment left organizations have begun to suffer at the hands of the immigration authorities for the participation of "foreigners" in their ranks.

Trotskyism in Costa Rica confronts various opponents on the left, with which we compete to recruit radicalized persons. The Partido Vanguardia Popular (Peoples Vanguard party), the Costa Rican CP, is an old-line Stalinist party and the largest group on the left. (It supports the constitutional amendment for a standing army, as well as the regime's new birth-control policy that eliminates free contraception.) The Partido Socialista (Socialist party), which was once affected by the Cuban revolution, is in crisis and has suffered greatly from its lack of ideological definition. The Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary Movement of the People), of Castroist origin, is also in crisis and has suffered numerous splits.

The OST, for its part, has been considerably strengthened. It now has twelve members who function full-time, and it publishes 4,000 copies of its monthly newspaper Qué Hacer?. With three branches functioning in San José, Heredia, and Tiberia, it has about fifty members.

The OST's main tasks are the following: developing an approach to the other left organizations, in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections; work among university students, such as

participating in the student movement rejecting tuition at the university; trade union work, in which the OST's role in the formation of the Organización Sindical de Trabajadores de Guanacaste (Guanacaste Workers' Trade-Union Organization) stands out; work among women and against the new birth-control policy; spreading revolutionary Marxist ideas; the sale of <u>Qué Hacer</u>?; and financial work to sustain the activity of the organization (there are some 100 sympathizers of the OST who make regular contributions). The OST is also making a big effort to maintain contact with the international movement, exchanging materials, attending congresses and meetings, etc.

The PRT of Costa Rica

The PRT of Costa Rica was next in the order of reports at the conference. However, the comrade of the PRT explained that he was not going to present a report, since everyone there had attended the PRT's congress that had just ended the day before. Those present were limited to asking the comrade questions, which he answered partially and which Greco, who was assisting the PRT comrade, completed answering. The discussion turned mainly around the doubts raised by the comrade from the LOC of Colombia, who insisted that the axis of work adopted by the PRT lacked anticapitalist slogans. Alfonso Rios also objected that the PRT's orientation suffered from the absence of calls for the formation of soviet- or semisoviet-type committees in Costa Rica. Greco answered these arguments, characterizing them as "student-like" and pointing out that there was a difference between general propaganda for Trotskyist ideas or for the revolutionary program, and agitation around a slogan that correspond to the present "stage" of consciousness of the Costa Rican masses. Rodrigo, of the OST, focused more on explaining to the comrade from the LOC the actual level of mobilization in Costa Rica, instead of trying to pin a label on the situation.

Almost everyone participated in this discussion, and the debate followed more or less the factional divisions in the international.

The LSR of Panama

The next report was given by a leading member of the Liga Socialista Revolucionaria of Panama. The report dealt mainly with the LSR's position on the military government of Torrijos and the struggle for Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Torrijos took office through a coup in 1968. His government has tried to play the role of arbiter among the various factions of the Panamanian ruling class. The government is at present seeking to "renegotiate Panama's dependence" on American imperialism (in the words of the LSR comrade). It is a "Bonapartist regime sui genris," basing itself on the discontent of the Panamanian masses in order to negotiate a new canal treaty with Washington. Its margin of maneuver, however, has been stretched very thin, and it has set back certain conquests of the masses—such as the right to strike—and has restricted democratic rights, against the opposition of even the bourgeois courts.

According to the comrade from the LSR, the present development of the Panamanian government may mean the Torrijos regime is losing more and more of its character as "Bonapartism sui generis," and is being transformed into a repressive military dictatorship.

In September 1976 the National Guard severely repressed the mobilizations of the Panamanian workers. The workers were struggling for economic demands, against the reforms of the labor code that eliminated the right to strike, and for the expulsion of American imperialism from the Canal Zone. As a result of the defeat inflicted on the workers, the mobilization of the masses is declining at present, and Torrijos has opened a political offensive, launching a big anticommunist campaign.

The comrade also reported on developments inside the LSR. The organization broke with the "Camiloists" (followers of the Colombian guerrilla leader Camilo Torres) and approached the Fourth International. It adopted at its foundation the policy of "unity in action/outflanking" that has been recommended by the International Majority Tendency, and oriented itself toward the student organizations FER and Guaycucho. The comrade described this course as "ultraleft and propagandist."

In January 1976 the LSR suffered a crisis. The majority of the leadership had adopted a characterization of the Torrijos government as "petty bourgeois." (I wasn't able to obtain documentation about this point, although the comrade promised to send it to me.) It was deduced from this that there could be no bloc with the bourgeoisie on the question of democratic rights. This was why the LSR did not campaign against the expulsion of various opposition figures from the country, such as Miguel Antonio Bernal.

There was a struggle of tendencies. It arose over organizational problems, but was extended to political points such as the need to raise domocratic demands. There was only one declared tendency, the Democratic Tendency, which stressed the necessity of raising democratic demands.

The August 1976 congress adopted a change in the political line of the LSR. The "venguardist" policy was replaced by one of carrying out three campaigns: defense of the standard of living; for democratic rights; for Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone and the return of the canal to Panama.

As a result of the internal crisis at the beginning of 1976, the LSR stopped regular publication of its paper Revolución Socialista, which had a run of 2,000 copies. They now project publishing a biweekly. At the present time Revolución Socialista comes out monthly, in mimeographed form.

At present the LSR has forty-two members in seven cells.

After the report, there was a full discussion. The Bloque Socialista of Colombia distributed a mimeographed article taken from their press, in which can be found some peculiar conclusions derived from the term "Bonapartism sui generis." The comrades of the ISR also presented a written position in mimeographed form.

The discussion took place on two questions. One was raised by the comrade from the LOC: He said the slogan demanding immediate return of the canal should not be raised unless workers control is demanded at the same time. The other question was raised by Rodrigo, in reference to the mimeoed contribution from the Bloque Socialista. The term "Bonapartism sui generis," he said, was never used by Trotsky; the reactionary character of regimes such as Torrijos' should be clearly explained, since they are antiworker governments—antiyouth, antidemocratic, etc.

The comrades of the LSR seemed to be in agreement with the fact that the Torrijos regime is, to say the least, inconsistent with its nationalist demagogy, and is a government that represses workers, students, and dissidents in general. Greco did not intervene on this particular point, although he did defend the peculiar idea of the BT that the struggle for democratic rights is a "tactical" question. He also said that even if Trotsky hadn't created the category of "Bonapartism sui generis," it had to be created in any event.

Comandos Camilistas -- Espartaco -- LOC, of Colombia

The next report was given by a leading member of the Liga Obrera Comunista of Colombia. The comrade spoke generally about the positions of the LOC and the objective situation in Colombia.

He also reported that the LOC had arisen from a split in the Bloque Socialista, caused by "programmatic, tactical, and organizational differences, and by different international alignments." The LOC proposed a Trotskyist unification congress among the Bloque Socialista, the Grupo Marxista Internacionalista (International Marxist Group), Comandos Camilistas (Camiloist Commandos), and Espartaco (Spartacus). But, he said, the LOC is not going to enter the Bloque Socialista as the GMI has, because the Bolshevik Tendency, to which the BS is affiliated, has a policy of creating parallel organizations in the international.

The LOC claims a membership of some 130 persons. It will hold a congress in May to unify the LOC, the

Comandos Camilistas, and Espartaco. The comrade ostimated that the fusion of the three organizations will result in a membership of about 500.

The Bloque Socialista of Colombia

A leading comrade from the Bloque Socialista of Colombia gave the next report. He spoke extensively on the history of the workers and peasants movement in Colombia during recent decades, and on the BS's analysis of the present situation. The BS publishes some 6,000 copies of a weekly newspaper, and claims a membership of six to seven hundred. The comrade protested the fact that the LOC, the Comandos Camilistas, and Espartaco maintain a "sectarian and exclusionist" position toward the BS, since it has not been invited to participate in the fusion process that the three groups are carrying out. He reported that they have excluded the BS from their committee of liaison.

The PRT and the LS of Mexico

Alfonso Ríos and I reached agreement on presenting a brief report on the situation in Mexico. He spoke about the situation of the economy and the government following the devaluation of the peso, and I took up related developments in the class struggle in recent months. Afterwards I described briefly the situation of the Liga Socialista, of which I am a member. I spoke about the work we are carrying out and about our position on unification with the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores.

Ríos ended his report on Mexico by talking about the PRT. Besides reporting his estimation that the PRT now has some 1,000 members nationally and that it publishes the weekly newspaper Bandera Socialista, he upbraided the Bolshevik Tendency for the behavior of its members inside the PRT.

For various reasons the discussion on Mexico and Colombia opened as soon as Ríos finished his report. Greco answered Ríos, saying that the cause of the Mexican PRT's present problem is not the BT, but the method with which the fusion was carried out. He gave more or less the same arguments that are contained in his letter to the United Secretariat on the unification process that culminated last September in the founding congress of the PRT.

For his part, the comrade from the IOC explained why his organization has not fused with the BS. In other words, he explained the differences that led to the split.

The comrade from the BS, besides answering the LOC comrade, mentioned the strange proceeding through which the great majority of the members of his organi-

zation joined the Bolshevik Tendency: The membership was given a time limit of three or four months in which to "choose a side" [tomar partido] in the international discussion. For the leaders of the BS it is "criminal" to abstain from taking a position in such an important debate. I don't remember precisely what he said about the fate that befell those members who might have needed more that four months to adopt a position on a discussion that has already lasted eight years.

The Plans of the "United Secretariat"

The last day of the conference was devoted to the other two points on the agenda, the first of which was a report by Ríos on the "proposals of the United Secretariat for coordinating the organizations in Central America." Ríos reported that the United Secretariat had "decided" to send Comrade Riel to live in Mexico; that the "International Commission" of the PRT would function as a sort of Latin American bureau; and that the PRT would finance a special publication for Central America.

I asked Ríos if there had been an official resolution of the United Secretariat on this point, and if there would be an official communication from some leading body of the international to verify this. Ríos answered that he didn't know of any official decision and that he had been informed of Riel's plans by a telephone call. Apparently excited, he explained to us the necessity of "centralizing" the Fourth International, that the United Secretariat required more resources and greater freedom of action, that the IMT has the "right" to direct the center, and that the IMT and the BT weren't collaborating at present with the center.

Rodrigo, of the OST, reminded Rios of the provision in the statutes of the Fourth International, according to which the United Secretariat has no power to create "commissions" to try to "lead" the work of the sections in specific regions. Much less, said Rodrigo, could any "commission" of the PRT function as a Latin American Bureau, or any publications of this "commission" have official authority.

For Greco, on the other hand, it was "very good" that Jean Pierre would be transferring to Mexico, for several reasons: He would establish official relations between the United Secretariat and the Latin American organizations, and he would further the development of the preparatory debate for the next world congress. From Greco's point of view, the problem did not merit major discussion.

Perhaps I was in error, but in my opinion Rios was laying out for us some schema that has been worked out by the IMT, and not something that had been presented to the United Secretariat for approval. All the elaborations

of Ríos about the "plan" seemed quite absurd to me, and besides that, I also have my doubts about the "official" character of Ríos's role as a representative or an "envoy" [enviado] of the United Secretariat to the PRT congress and to the conference in Costa Rica. (Ríos explained to me later that he had not been named by the United Secretariat but by the Bureau.) Whatever the case, the whole thing smacks strongly of "commissarism."

After the discussion, Ríos finally drew back several points: the "international commission" of the PRT wasn't going to be a Latin American Bureau but only an auxiliary and administrative body to aid Riel in his work; the magazine published by this commission, Revolución Socialista, is the sole responsibility of the PRT; and—to satisfy a request by Greco—he would put in writing a brief declaration concerning the trip of Riel to Mexico. (See appendix.) This discussion couldn't go much further, since at the time there was no way to confirm the official character of the plans to send Riel to Mexico. But our position remained clear—as long as there is no official decision, Riel will be simply an envoy of the IMT and not of some leading body of the international.

The last point on the agenda consisted of a series of unreal proposals. They aren't worth the trouble to detail; none of them will be possible to realize. Two more realistic points were also approved: the OST and the PRT of Costa Rica would join forces to build a committee in defense of the victims of repression in Central America, and the conference would issue a statement calling for solidarity with the struggle for Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. This statement will be published in some organ of some Central American Trotskyist organization.

March 17, 1977

Appendix to Report on Central American Trotskyist Conference

San José March 16, 1977

Statement by Alfonso Rios on Comrade Riel's Residing in Mexico

Comrade Riel, a member of the United Secretariat assigned to Latin American work, is coming to live in Mexico City in June and will remain there for approximately one year.

During his stay, he will be able to gain more of a first-hand acquaintance with the problems of the region and thereby to improve still more his knowledge of the area and his work concerning it.

The Mexican section of the Fourth International will put all its political and administrative resources at Comrade Riel's disposal to enable him to carry out his assignment as a member of the USec.

Alfonso Rios

Sent by the Bureau of the United Secretariat and the Mexican PRT as an observer at the congress of the Costa Rican PRT.

Report on the Congress of the Costa Rican PRT By Roberto and Rodrigo

The Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) of Costa Rica, formerly the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (ICI), held its first congress on March 11-13.

The congress was constituted as a full membership meeting, not as a body of delegates. In addition to the twenty-one members present with voting rights, several sympathizers of the ex-LCI and members of various Trotskyist organizations in Latin America attended as observers. Alfonso Ríos acted as the representative of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International at the congress.

It should be noted that, of the two authors of this report, Rodrigo was present from the beginning of the congress, while Roberto attended only the last day's sessions. The invitation to Rodrigo, of the Organización Socialista de los Trabajadores (OST), to attend the congress marked a significant change. Up to then, the LCI had carried out an ultrasectarian policy toward the OST, totally ignoring the other Trotskyist organization in Costa Rica.

The general policies of the ex-LCI have undergone drastic changes as well. This can be attributed to the presence of Greco, a leading member of the Bolshevik Tendency in the Fourth International, who had resided in Costa Rica for the last two months.

The first point taken up by the congress, which was convened Friday evening, was the approval of a series of rules for the discussion. Under these rules, all the observers were barred from attending the sessions on "organizational" points. These included a disciplinary action, the statutes, election of the leadership, and so on. Only Alfonso Rios was allowed to sit in on these points.

On Saturday, March 13, the "Program and Principles of the Party" were discussed. This was followed by a discussion around several proposals made by an observer from the OST. Many of the remarks made by this comrade were accepted, although there was a difference over the conception of a "workers and peasants government." The viewpoint of the OST was that "workers and peasants governments" did not necessarily mean "dictatorship of the proletariat," while Greco defended the position that "workers and peasants government" is the same as "dictatorship of the proletariat."

The first "organizational" point taken up by the congress concerned a disciplinary measure: the expulsion of R. for not having paid a special financial pledge on time. R. was not present during this session. He argued that, on the one hand, the manner in which he was notified that his case was going to be discussed was unacceptable—the night before, a handwritten note had been put under the door of his apartment—and that, on the other hand, the point was going to be dealt with in

the absence of the United Secretariat representative. In fact, Rios arrived at the congress only after the point had been discussed.

R. also said that he could not pay the dues or special pledge to which he had agreed, because he had planned to obtain the money that the ex-ICI had solicited from him by means of a loan, and that he planned to use part of this money to solve his serious personal financial problems.

Since his expulsion, R. has applied for membership in the OST, and had also appealed his case to the leadership of the international, since there had been rumors—supposedly spread by the ex-LCI—to the effect that he stole funds from the organization.

The second "political" point of the congress concerned the period, the political conjuncture, and the tasks in Costa Rica. On this point, a motion by Greco was passed, which said that the observers could have the floor only after the report, and could not intervene until the point was finished. The purpose of this motion was to prevent the OST observers from having a chance to participate in the discussion.

The reporter for the PRT dealt primarily with the political axis of the organization's work for the next period, which he said would be the struggle to defend and raise the standard of living, for the right to organize unions, and for democratic rights.

Andrés made a contribution for the OST, pointing out, among other things, that the measures taken by the Costa Rican government were tending to create a large repressive apparatus. As an example of this, he pointed to the creation of an army, since Costa Rica has not maintained a military force up to now. He said it was crucial to broaden the scope of the demands to include sectors such as public employees, women and students. He pointed to the Costa Rican government's offensive against free contraceptives, and also discussed the upcoming presidential elections.

The discussion on this point lasted until Sunday morning, March 13. Finally, the point on PRT-OST relations was taken up, under which the presiding committee presented a motion that effectively ruled out a course toward a principled unification. The motion admitted that there had been a sectarian policy toward the OST, which had begun to be superseded with the invitations to the OST to attend the congress as observers. However, the motion stated that unification could not take place on the basis of "general principles," but that "concrete agreements" on work in Costa Rica was necessary. Now, in the course of the congress, the OST had expressed irreconcilable differences. Therefore, no unification was possible.

Rios tried to amend this motion to make it sound more acceptable, but did not succeed. For its part, the OST stated that it did not consider the differences manifested at the congress irreconcilable.

The motion by the presiding committee on this particular point was finally passed. However, a countermotion by Rios received a considerable minority of six votes.

The subsequent points were on "organizational" questions, which neither Roberto nor Rodrigo were able to attend. We were, of course, informed that under the point on the statutes the PRT was approved as the name of the organization.

Afterwards, Rios informed us of a major incident that occurred during the point on the election of the leadership. This incident was provoked by the fact that, when the votes were counted, the presiding committee discovered that one of the ballots contained five question marks instead of five names. One of the members of the presiding committee threw away the ballot, calling it a "fraudulent vote." According to Rios, the person who had cast the "fraudulent vote" got angry, and took the floor to say that he had voted this way because he did not have confidence in the leadership. After this verbal skirmish, he again asked to speak. This was denied, but he took the floor anyway, to say that he was resigning from the PRT. Ana, a member of the presiding committee, replied, "Don't make petty-bourgeois remarks." He left the room, followed by four other members of the PRT.

According to what Ríos told us, we were able to establish that, outside the congress meeting place, where the observers who could not attend the election of the leadership for reasons mentioned previously were waiting, the author of the "fraudulent vote" went up to Rodrigo to ask to be accepted as a sympathizer of the OST. At the present time, this comrade and three others who have resigned from the PRT are holding discussions with the OST.

Ríos also told us that a meeting took place inside the congress hall to discuss the error made by Ana. According to Ríos, he strongly upbraided this comrade for her behavior, and said that what was involved were methods utilized by the Bolshevik Tendency, methods that are extremely dangerous.

At the end of the discussion, Ana made a humiliating "self-criticism," in which she said that she herself was the one who was "petty-bourgeois," and that her error had absolutely nothing to do with the BT. The congress established a commission to apologize to the ill-treated comrade who had left the room.

On Monday, March 14, as a supplement to the congress, a "plenum" of PRT members was held, to which Rios, Roberto and Greco were invited, in order to explain the positions of the IMT, LTF and BT, respectively. The members of the OST were also invited to attend.

This "plenum" could not be very enlightening, since the proponents were allowed only thirty minutes to explain a discussion that has been going on in the international for eight years. However, it would have been an error not to attend.

The results of the "plenum" were encouraging, in everyone's opinion. Four former members of a centrist formation in Costa Rica (the MRP), who attended the PRT congress as sympathizers, formed a favorable impression of the positions of the OST. Since the plenum, they have recognized that the LTF's positions are better, and are asking to have discussions with Rodrigo. The congress had clarified for them the methods and political positions of the BT. At the present time they are sympathizers of the OST.

March 17, 1977

*

TRANSLATION

TO: Groupe Socialiste des Travailleurs du Québec

Dear Comrades,

You must surely be aware that, following a series of clarifications on both sides, the two organizations to which we are affiliated—the OCRFI and the Fourth International—reached the conclusion that it would be possible to open a public political discussion between our two currents (each current having characterized the other, last October, as revolutionary and Trotskyist).

However, we must recognize that, here in Québec, there has been no counterpart to such a procedure as yet. Numerous differences, both with respect to general politics and to tactics, have been responsible for the considerable distance between our respective organizations. We believe, however, that in light of the present political period, ongoing exchanges and discussions between our organizations are not only possible, but desirable.

On the other hand, such a procedure cannot be separated from a clear political characterization of our organizations, which must be based, at least, on each recognizing the other as a workers' organization. We feel that our position on the GSTQ has been clearly defined in the greetings given to the conference of the Montréal branch of the LSO/LSA this past February (attached). Unfortunately, there is still much confusion surrounding the GSTQ's present characterization of the GMR.

Therefore, we think there is a need at this time for a clear, public and unambiguous characterization of the GMR. This letter constitutes our request for such a characterization.

Along this with, we are proposing that an initial meeting take place between our respective leaderships, that could begin to set matters right, with the aim of clarifying our respective political positions. We think that such a meeting could take place in the next few weeks. If you agree, please get in touch with Léon Peillard or Yves Desjardins at our bookstore, to make definite arrangements.

Communist greetings,

Political Bureau of the GMR [Groupe Marxiste Revolutionnaire]

cc: United Secretariat, LSO/LSA